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KAMPUCHEA: THE ENDLESS TUG OF WAR 
by Justus M van der Kroef 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 1981, the United Nations General Assembly, 
for the third consecutive year, voted in a better than two to one ma-
jority to continue to allow what is presently the underground govern-
ment of "Democratic Kampuchea" (DK) headed by President Khieu 
Sampan and chief guerrilla commander Pol Pot, to keep its seat as 
the legitimate Cambodian government. The vote was 77 to 37, with 
31 abstentions. This was an even more decisive defeat than in previ-
ous years for the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam (SRV), which have been sponsoring recognition of the Hanoi-
installed "People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK) government of 
President Heng Samrin, in control of Phnom Penh since January, 
1979. 1 Despite PRK Foreign Ministry protestations to UN Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim that the Khieu Sampan-Pol Pot regime is 
but "a band of pirates conducting terrorist activities," and Hanoi's 
charge that the DK's presence of the UN was made possible only 
because "Beijing reactionaries" colluding with the "US imperialists 
and other reactionary forces have bribed some countries and put 
pressure on them,"2 most UN members have continued to go along 
as in 1979 and 1980 with the skillful anti-Heng Samrin lobbying of 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 
Yet the decisive September 18 UN vote masks important policy 
differences among the ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, the Philippines and Thailand) regarding the long-term im-
plications of the Kampuchean question and how to resolve it, as well 
as conflicting interests among the superpowers. Rapid changes in 
policy posture and the launching of new diplomatic initiatives render 
analysis of the Kampuchean problem even more difficult. For exam-
ple, even before the September 18, 1981 UN General ASsembly vot-
ing, the Soviet Union, which in previous months had adamantly 
supported Hanoi in confronting ASEAN with an unyielding demand 
for the Heng Samrin regime's recognition, began to counsel the 
I. In 1980 the vote in the UN General Assembly was 74 to 35 with 32 abstentions, 
and in 1979 it was 71 to 35, also with 32 abstentions. 
2. Radio Phnom Penh, domestic service in Cambodia, September 19, 1981, and 
Nilan Dan (Hanoi), September 20, 1981, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
reports [hereinafter FBIS] September 21, 1981. 
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Vietnamese to show a more restrained and even conciliatory attitude 
toward ASEAN. At least two ASEAN members, Indonesia and Ma-
laysia, which, driven by fear of People's Republic of China's long-
term ambitions, have been interested in reaching a political accom-
modation with the SRV over the Kampuchean issue are, reportedly, 
targets for "cultivation" during this new Soviet-Vietnamese gambit.3 
Commonwealth members, like the United Kingdom and Australia, 
which participate in bilateral military exercises with some ASEAN 
members but refuse to recognize either the Khieu Sampan or the 
Heng Samrin regimes, and the United States, which during most of 
1981 closely followed Beijing's lead in the diplomatic interplay on 
the Kampuchean question, are directly involved in the outcome of 
these and other new initiatives. 
In an attempt to sort out the conflicting interests and diverging 
policy postures and nuances in the Kampuchean question both in 
the international arena and "on the ground" in Kampuchea itself, 
the following pages will briefly focus on four aspects: (1) the official 
position of and "unofficial" internal divisions within ASEAN, with 
respect to the Kampuchean problem; (2) the policies of the other 
major powers involved, particularly the United States, People's Re-
public of China and the Soviet Union; (3) the prospects of contend-
ing factions in Kampuchea itself; and, (4) alternative approaches to 
a possible solution of the Kampuchean problem which threatens not 
only to become a hardy perennial in international diplomacy, but 
also to become the pivot of future ASEAN relations with its regional 
neighbors and the major world powers. 
I. THE PERSPECI'IVE OF ASEAN COUNTRIES: OFFICIAL 
POSITION AND "UNOFFICIAL" INTERNAL 
DIVISIONS 
Mutual suspicion and hostility, interspersed with periodic pro-
fessions of good will by both sides, have marked the contradictory 
course of Hanoi-ASEAN relations since the course of the latter's 
founding in 1967. Initially, and while preoccupied with its aim of 
unifying Vietnam, Hanoi had had few positive comments about 
ASEAN. Hanoi's media linked ASEAN's appearance to US "imper-
alist" ventures in Southeast Asia, and authoritative pronouncements 
of Hanoi's ally, the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Viet-
3. Nayan Chanda, "Summit of discretion," Far Eastem Economic Revi~. Vol. 113, 
no. 39 (Sept. 18, 1981), pp. 11-13; Editorial, "Changing Hanoi Attitude Fits Soviet Strat-
egy," Nation Review (Bangkok), September 18, 1981. 
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nam, tied the Communist struggle in Vietnam closely to various rev-
olutionary "liberation" movements in Thailand and the Philippines. 
When in 1971 ASEAN members pledged themselves to make their 
area into an internationally recognized "Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality" (ZOPF AN), Hanoi described ASEAN as but "a 
product of US aggressive and interventionist policy." Hanoi also 
later insisted that all of Southeast Asia should rid itself of US influ-
ence, and stated that the Vietnamese fully supported the "struggle of 
the peoples of the Southeast Asian nations for independence, democ-
racy, peace and social progress."4 
Yet, by July 1975, with the Communist unification of Vietnam 
an accomplished fact, there were also signs that a new and more 
hopeful departure might be possible. Malaysia's premier Tun Abdul 
Razak declared that the recent triumph of Communist regimes in 
Vietnam and Cambodia posed no threat to Southeast Asia, and he 
even mooted the possibility of their entry into ASEAN. Hanoi, in 
tum, in a general July 5, 1976 foreign policy statement, stressed com-
mitment to peaceful co-existence, non-interference in the internal af-
fairs of other countries, and peaceful settlement of disputes. About 
the same time Vietnamese deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien vis-
ited ASEAN capitals for a cool but correct get-acquainted visit. 
Still, in subsequent years, Hanoi kept tempting ASEAN into aban-
doning its close ties with the West, urging creation of a new form of 
regional cooperation, a zone of "Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" 
(PIN) that would replace ZOPFAN. Though such ploys were re-
jected by suspicious ASEAN leaders, SRV spokesmen, like premier 
Pham Van Dong, in another ASEAN tour in September, 1978, per-
sisted in portraying his government as having had a genuine change 
of heart about ASEAN. They also promised, despite ASEAN skep-
ticism, that the SR V would not support Communist insurgents oper-
ating in ASEAN countries. 5 
Shortly thereafter, Vietnam's acceleration invasion of 
Kampuchea at the close of 1978, and the installation, backed by 
200,000 SRV troops, of the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh the 
following January 8, forced ASEAN-Vietnamese relations to a new 
4. Nhan Dan (Hanoi), December I, 1971 and February 28, 1976. See also J.M. van 
der Kroef, "What Are the Aims of the NLF?," Vietnam Perspectives, November, 1967, 
pp. 3-20, and "The War Seen from Hanoi," Vietnam Perspectives, February, 1966, pp. 22-
31. 
5. Philippines Evening Express (Manila), July 8, 1975; The Straits Times (Singa-
pore), October 18, 1978; Agence France Presse dispatches, Hong Kong, July 24, 1978, 
and Ipoh, Malaysia, October 18, 1978 (FBIS, July 25 and October 19, 1978). 
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nadir. On January 13, 1979, ASEAN foreign ministers, in a special 
Bangkok conference, called for the withdrawal of all "foreign 
forces" from Kampuchean soil. By November 14, 1979, the UN 
General Assembly passed a similar ASEAN-sponsored resolution 
after first having confirmed the underground Khieu Sampan-Pol Pot 
regime as the rightful holder of Kampuchea's UN seat. However, in 
subsequent months, neither UN disapproval, nor the increased de-
fense and intelligence cooperation among ASEAN members, swayed 
Hanoi from continuing its Kampuchean occupation or from tighten-
ing its hold as well on its Laotian ally in the interests of Vietnamese 
media began calling the "Vietnames~ .unity bloc." 
Indeed, new ASEAN overtures toward Hanoi to discuss the 
Kampuchean situation made at the close of 1979 met with sharp 
Vietnamese criticism of ASEAN's alleged "crude interference'' in 
Kampuchean affairs and of ASEAN's failure to recognize 
Kampuchea's "right to self determination." At the same time, how-
ever, the SRV proved willing to discuss the Kampuchean question 
with Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen. On 
January 5, 1980, a Phnom Penh conference of the SRV, LPDR and 
PRK Foreign Ministers offered friendship and cooperation to South-
east Asia and even bilateral treaties of non-aggression between indi-
vidual Indochinese and ASEAN states. 6 
Some ASEAN states remained skeptical. But between March 
26 and 28, 1980, Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian pre-
mier Dato Hussein Onn, after a joint conference in the East Malay-
sian town of Juantan, adopted a new policy position. Both Suharto 
and Ohn insisted that Vietnam be as free as possible from depen-
dence on, or influence by, either the Soviet Union or People's Re-
public of China and that, in Kampuchea, a "political solution" 
rather than a military one be sought. Such a political solution would 
give some recognition to Hanoi's security interests in Kampuchea. 
In this "Kuantan principle" as it came to be known, Suharto's and 
Onn's views reflected a significant body of ASEAN opinion that a 
strong but independent Vietnam could be a strategic regional asset, 
since it might function as a desirable counterweight in the future to 
the influence in Southeast Asia of a modernizing, resurgent China. 
Moreover, it was felt that, in any case, Hanoi's long-term political 
and security interests in Kampuchea would have to be recognized in 
6. The Southeast Asia Record, December 27, 1979-January 3, 1980, p. 10, and Ra-
dio Hanoi, VNA, January 7, 1980 (FBIS, January 9, 1980). 
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some way if the stalemate over the issue was to be broached. 7 
In May, 1980, the head of Indonesia's military intelligence, 
Lieutenant General Ben Murdani, a confidant of Suharto, arrived in 
Hanoi to discuss the Kampuchean question. But before a further 
implementation of the Kuantan principle could be sought, the tense 
refugee problem along the Thai-Kampuchean border erupted into a 
new crisis. Vietnamese forces on June 23, 1980, briefly invaded 
Thailand, presumably in retaliation for a recent Bangkok govern-
ment decision to begin repatriating Kampuchean refugees held in 
various Thai camps. The refugees were viewed by the SR V and the 
Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh as being pushed by the 
Thais into the guerrilla army of Pol Pot. 8 This was further evidence, 
Hanoi alleged, that Bangkok was conspiring with Beijing to bring 
the Hen Samrin regime down. 
The ASEAN reaction to the SRV's brief invasion was swift. 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the end of their conference in Kuala 
Lumpur on June 26, 1980 appeared to have regretted the Suharto-
Onn Kuantan initiative and reaffirmed their demand for a "total 
withdrawal" of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchean soil. Yet, 
hardly had the Kuala Lampur conference ended when both Indone-
sian and Malaysian spokesmen began insisting on the need for a 
"new dialogue" with Hanoi. Meanwhile the Vietnamese Communist 
Party daily, though blaming Thailand and calling the situation in 
Kampuchea "irreversible," also expressed the hope for future 
"peaceful and friendly relations" with ASEAN. Moreover, at a July 
17, 1980 Vientiane Foreign Ministers conference, the "Indochina 
unity bloc" appeared to take up the "Juantan'' approach, now refer-
ring in a communique to "the development of the situation in the 
region" which was said to necessitate ''understanding of and respect 
for each other's legitimate interests." The Vientiane meeting also of-
fered new discussions to solve the Thai-Kampuchean refugee prob-
lem, and elaborated on the idea of. establishing a possible 
"demilitarized" zone between Kampuchea and Thailand, an idea 
first suggested by Japanese Foreign Office specialists.9 
Still, all such suggestions were eventually rejected by ASEAN 
7. Justus M. van der K.roef, "ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Confiict: Be-
tween 'Jauntan' and a 'Third Alternative,'" Asian Survey, May, 1981, pp. 515-535. 
8. The Asian Record, July, 1980, p. 15. 
9. Nhan Dan, June 29, 1980; Antara DaUy News Bulletin, July 4, 1980 (Vol 32, no. 
151), p. I; Malaysian Digest (Kuala Lampur), June 30, 1980), p. 2; Radio Hanoi, July 18, 
1980) (FBIS, July 21, 1980); Derek Davies, "Victory for the Hardline Hawks," Far East-
em Economic Review, Vol 109, no. 28 (July 4, 1980), p. 13. 
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leaders as being "diversionary." The Vientiane proposals, from 
ASEAN's vantage point, seemed designed to shift attention from the 
issue of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea to the problem of 
the Thai-Kampuchean border refugees. By the time the UN Gen-
eral Assembly opened in the fall of 1980, even Vietnamese offers to 
open "immediate discussions" with ASEAN on Kampuchea specifi-
cally on the basis of the Kuantan principle; the June 26, 1980 Kuala 
Lampur statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers; or, the July 18, 
1980 Vientiane proposals of the Indochina bloc were equally devalu-
ated. Even Djakarta and Kuala Lampur seemed determined to 
make it clear to Hanoi that whatever "political solution" could be 
found in the Kampuchean problem, it would have to involve signifi-
cant Vietnamese concessions. To ASEAN it seemed that only a per-
sistent demonstration of the weight of adverse world opinion about 
Hanoi's continuing presence in Kampuchea could drive this point 
home. 
To this end, ASEAN and People's Republic of China succeeded 
in the UN General Assembly on October 22, 1980 in winning contin-
ued recognition as a UN member for the Khieu Sampan-Pol Pot 
government. Moreover, somewhat earlier, on October 13, they per-
suaded the Assembly to agree to hold an international conference on 
Kampuchea the following year. The conference was to include "all 
parties" to the dispute and would, among other issues, deal with the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, the holding of free 
elections in, and the formulation of, international guarantees for 
both the independence and "neutrality" of Kampuchea. From the 
Indochina bloc came an immediate rejection of such a conference as 
being but evidence of the "collusion between Beijing, Washington 
and Bangkok," and this was said to make the presence of 
Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea now "more necessary than ever." 10 
Yet, once again, behind such seemingly unequivocal stances, 
both in Hanoi and ASEAN, further explorations toward a more con-
ciliatory policy continued to be made. For example, on January 28, 
1981, yet another Indochina "unity bloc" foreign ministers confer-
ence, this time in Ho Chi Minh City, proposed to ASEAN a "re-
gional" rather than an "international" UN -sponsored conference on 
Kampuchean and related questions. Such a "regional" conference, 
as the Ho Chi Minh City communique put it, would "discuss 
problems of mutual concern according to the principle of nonimposi-
10. Radio Phnom Penh, October 15 and November 1, 1980; Radio Hanoi, October 
15, 1980 (FBIS, October 15 and 17, November 4, 1980). 
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tion of the will of one group on the other." As an apparent induce-
ment, the Ho Chi Minh City conference added that Vietnam would 
be prepared to withdraw some of its forces from Kampuchea, if the 
Thais stopped providing bases and supplies for Pol Pot's guerrillas. 
Complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, as Hanoi had so often 
emphasized in the past, could only come, however, if "the threat 
from China no longer exists." 11 
It might be noted that in subsequent weeks the Soviet Union, 
through its ASEAN ambassadors, kept giving strong backing to what 
Moscow termed Hanoi's "new constructive initiatives." However, at 
this time even the Indonesian Foreign Office described the idea of a 
limited "regional" conference as but a "trap." The "trap," as Indo-
nesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja explained, was 
that if ASEAN met only with the three Indochina states, it would be 
tantamount to an ASEAN recognition of the Hanoi-backed Heng 
Samrin government in Phnom Penh. Hanoi, as one official Djakarta 
radio commentary characterized the Ho Chi Minh City proposal, "is 
saying ASEAN must justify the result of the Vietnamese military in-
tervention in Kampuchea." 12 The Soviets, however, appeared to 
have made the Ho Chi Minh City conference proposal virtually into 
a new diplomatic initiative of their own, linking it to an Asian collec-
tive security concept adumbrated by Soviet party chairman Leonid 
Brezhnev a decade ago, and quickly forgotten. 13 In Bangkok, on 
January 27, 1981, the visiting deputy chairman of the Presidium of 
the USSR's Supreme Soviet presented what was described as the 
Brezhnev proposals in a discussion of the Kampuchean problem 
with Thai deputy premier Thanat Khoman. The latter said that 
"We do not understand much of what he said," but added that it was 
Vietnam that was occupying Kampuchea and that had installed the 
Heng Samrin regime. 14 
In ASEAN circles, meanwhile, increased attention now came to 
be focused on yet another "political compromise" gambit, namely 
the promotion of a ''Third Alternative" regime for Kampuchea (i.e. 
neither Heng Samrin's PRK, nor Khieu Sainpan-Pol Pot's "Demo-
II. Nhan lJan, January 29, 1981 (FBIS, January 29, 1981), and The Straits Times, 
January 30, 1981. 
12. Agence France Presse dispatch, Djakarta, February 3, 1980, and Radio Djakarta, 
domestic service, January 28, 1980. 
13. Alexander Gebhardt, ''The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian 
Survey, December, 1973, pp. 1075-1091; Arnold L. Horelick, ''The Soviet Union's Asian 
Collective Security Proposal," Pac!fo: Affairs, Fall, 1974, pp. 269-285. 
14. Xinhua dispatch, Bangkok, January 27, 1981 (FBIS, January 28, 1981). 
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cratic Kampuchea"), acceptable to all parties. The two chief con-
tenders for this possible "Third Alternative" regime, Cambodia's 
former ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk and one of his former 
premiers Son Sann, will be considered more fully below. In Septem-
ber 1981, in yet another round of discussions in Hanoi with 
Suharto's personal emissary, General Murdani, Vietnamese officials 
for the first time indicated a willingness to alter the structure of their 
client, the Heng Samrin regime. Hence, as one Indonesian source 
put it, "there will be a new group" in Phnom Penh that ''we (i.e. 
ASEAN) can talk to." 15 This signalled an important breakthrough. 
But, as we shall see, before the point was to be reached, a dramatic 
rift over Kampuchean policy had developed between ASEAN and 
the People's Republic of China, with the United States caught un-
comfortably in between. 
The reasons for ASEAN's redoubled emphasis on the "Third 
Alternative" approach probably stemmed in part from the disquiet 
among some of ASEAN's supporters. Major ASEAN allies like the 
United Kingdom and Australia were becoming increasingly dis-
enchanted with the protracted Kampuchean stalemate. Shortly after 
the UN General Assembly on October 22, 1980 again had affirmed 
"Democratic Kampuchea" as the rightful holder of Cambodia's UN 
seat, Canberra announced that in the future it would not do so again. 
Like the United Kingdom, Australia announced its position would 
be that there was no rightful claimant to Cambodia's UN seat at 
present. Privately, the Malcolm Fraser government reportedly was 
urging ASEAN ''to produce its long talked about third option for 
Kampuchea." 16 After a Washington journey and discussions with 
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Singapore's Second Deputy 
Premier (Foreign Affairs), S. Rajaratnam, said in early February 
1981, that ASEAN's "immediate objective" in the Kampuchean 
question was to create a ''Third Force," consisting of a ''united 
front" of all anti-Vietnamese and anti-Heng Samrin resistance 
groups, and to supply them with aid, including arms, so as to exert 
''just enough" pressure on Hanoi to make the latter understand that 
the resistance to its Kampuchean occupation would not disappear. 
According to Rajaratnam, Haig, Sihanouk and Son Sann, as well as 
the People's Republic of China, all approved of this idea. 17 
But after ASEAN Foreign Ministers had begun to detail their 
15. Guy Sacerdoti, ''The troubleshooter's trip," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 
113, no. 40 (Sept. 25, 1981), p. 12. 
16. Radio Melbourne, July 8, 1981 (FBIS, July 9, 1981). 
17. The Straits Times, February 5, 1981. 
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"Third Force" strategy in their June conference in Manila, Beijing 
began reacting quite differently to it and for good reason: the 
ASEAN approach would inevitably threaten the legitimacy and even 
existence of Beijing's client, the Khieu Sampan-Pol "Democratic 
Kampuchea" regime. For in their June 1981 Manila discussions, 
and as subsequently further refined, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
proposed a cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Kampuchea, the stationing of UN troops and of a temporary UN 
administration in Kampuchea pending free elections under UN su-
pervision, the "disarming of the varions conflicting factions" in 
Kampuchea, and, the formation of an international committee to 
"negotiate with Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China and all other 'interested parties' " on a permanent Kampuche-
an settlement. The Manila communique. also "welcomed" efforts by 
various Kampuchean factions to form a ''united front," and establish 
a coalition government. 18 
These proposals ASEAN intended to offer for adoption by the 
special, UN-sponsored international conference on Kampuchea 
called for, as noted above, by the UN General Assembly's resolution 
on October 13, 1980. But even before the first meeting in New York 
on July 13, 1981 of this special UN conference (consisting of 93 na-
tions and boycotted, despite UN Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim's strenuous mediation efforts, by the SRV, the PRK, the 
LPDR, the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies), the People's 
Republic of China had made its opposition known to some basic 
provisions of the ASEAN proposal. This Chinese opposition fo-
cused on the proposed "disarming" of contending Kampuchean fac-
tions, the sending of a UN peace-keeping force and establishment of 
a temporary UN administration in Kampuchea, and the formation 
of an international committee to "negotiate" with Hanoi, Moscow, 
and other parties to the Kampuchean dispute. All these measures, as 
Beijing saw it, would have the effect of jeopardizing the strength and 
legitimacy of its client, the Khieu Sampan-Pol Pot regime. 19 Though 
Singapore's delegate and ASEAN spokesman, Professor Tommy 
Koh, emphasized that ASEAN's demand for the disarming of all 
Kampuchean factions was "not negotiable," the Chinese insisted 
that only the "Heng Samrin puppet force" be disarmed, and that the 
"patriotic forces" in Kampuchea to permitted to develop their own 
18. Ibid, June 19, 1981, and the remarks of Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku 
Ahmad Rithauddeen in Agence France Presse dispatch, Kuala Lampur, July 8, 1981 
(FBIS, June 18, 1981). 
19. South China Morning Post, July 8, 1981. 
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"necessary measures" to insure free elections.2° There was, under-
standably, no quarrel over the question of "withdrawal of foreign" 
(i.e. Vietnamese) forces from Kampuchea. 
As the deadlock deepened, the United States, apparently desir-
ous of firming its relations with Beijing, strongly supported the Chi-
nese, and thereby, the Sampan-Pot regime's exclusive legitimacy. As 
several ASEAN sources confirmed to this writer, American infiuence 
on ASEAN to accept ultimately a vaguely worded French compro-
mise formula probably saved the conference from ending in an em-
barrassing failure. In the French formula, which was ultimately 
adopted on July 17, 1981 as the conference's formal closing state-
ment, the ASEAN call for a "disarming" of Kampuchean factions is 
deleted, and so is the call for the establishment of a UN "temporary 
administration" in Kampuchea. Instead, the French proposal calls 
for unspecified "appropriate measures for the maintenance of law 
and order in Cambodia and the holding of free elections" after "for-
eign forces" have pulled out of Kampuchea. 
ASEAN spokesmen tried to put as good a face on the UN con-
ference's outcome as possible. Singapore's Foreign Minister S. 
Dhanabalan pronounced himself "totally satisfied," and his Malay-
sian counterpart, Tengku Rithauddeen, said that ASEAN "had won 
all its objectives" at the conference?' Most observers agreed, how-
ever, that with the help of strong US lobbying, and in the boycott 
absence of the Soviet and Indochina blocs, the Chinese had had their 
way and succeeded in protecting their Kampuchean client, "Demo-
cratic Kampuchea."22 The latter, with a Chinese-supplied force of 
some 30,000 guerrillas and well-established territorial bases in the 
Phnom Kravanh (Cardomom Mountain) range and in Kampuchea's 
Western Battambang province along the Thai frontier, is clearly the 
largest anti-Heng Samrin and anti-Vietnamese force in Kampuchea 
today. Unless the Hen Samrin government suddenly acquired sig-
nificant popularity and strength on its own, a withdrawal of "for-
eign," i.e. Vietnamese forces, from Kampuchea, as provided for by 
various UN resolutions, would assure that the Khieu Sampan-Pol 
Pot "Democratic Kampuchea" regime would play a major role in, if 
not dominate, whatever specific "appropriate measures" might be 
undertaken to insure free elections in Kampuchea. 
For ASEAN, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, the result of 
20. New Nation (Singapore), July 16, 1981 and The Straits Times, July 17, 1981. 
21. The Straits Times, July 20, 1981. 
22. See, e.g. Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.N. Resolution on Cambodia Keeps Doors 
Open for Pol Pot," The New York Times, July 18, 1981, at AS, col. 1. 
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the New York conference could only underscore what appeared to 
be Beijing's long-term ambition to maintain its own hold on 
Kampuchea through its client regime there. Acquiescence in such an 
outcome would only perpetuate and indeed deepen the rigid polari-
zation of the Kampuchean problem and impede a solution. In the 
wake of the New York conference, therefore, ASEAN redoubled its 
efforts to develop a "Third Alternative" approach, bu one unlike 
previous "Third Alternative" approaches, that would recognize also 
the closer involvement of Beijing's client, "Democratic 
Kampuchea." Such an approach, it was believed, perhaps would 
also exert still further pressure on Hanoi, which up to now could 
take comfort from the internal divisions among the chief anti-
Vietnamese Kampuchean factions. 
And so, on September 2, 1981, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Son 
Sann and -to the surprise of many- Khieu Sampan began discus-
sions in Singapore in order to develop a "united front" of 
Kampucheans directed against the Vietnamese presence in 
Kampuchea. The road to this Singapore conference had been a par-
ticularly rocky one. Khieu Sampan's willingness to attend such dis-
cussions at all after Beijing's clear victory at the July 1981 New York 
conference may have been prompted as much by (1) strong ASEAN 
overtures in both Beijing and Washington expressing dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the New York conference, (2) subsequent pres-
sure by Beijing on Sampan, for reasons to be explained presently, 
and (3) the remarkable seemingly accommodating pronouncements 
in recent months of "Democratic Kampuchea's" spokesmen. 
Among the latter was the reported assertion by Sampan in a foreign 
press interview in his northwest Kampuchean base camp in August 
1980, that in terms of appeal for Kampucheans, "Communism is 
dead" and that "to reject Communism once and for all is undoubt-
edly the best way of uniting all Kampucheans in the anti-Vietnamese 
crusade as part of a national front."23 Then there was the assertion 
by Sampan's Foreign Minister, !eng Sary, during a Djakarta visit in 
November 1980, that "we are prepared to hand over power to any-
body capable of driving the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea." He 
also indicated that Sihanouk and Son Sann would be especially wel-
comed in this connection. 24 
One can only speculate on how seriously these and similar as-
surances made by "Democratic Kampuchea's" leaders were in-
23. The Straits Times, August 21, 1980. 
24. Le Monde (Paris), November 26, 1980) (FB/S, December 6, 1980). 
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tended to be taken. Certainly the policy of Sampan subsequent to 
the Singapore conference has only raised new questions. Most deci-
sive for Sampan's decision to attend the Singapore conference was 
Beijing's acceptance of the ASEAN argument that the forthcoming 
UN General Assembly meeting would be far more likely to reaffirm 
the Sampan-Pot regime for a third successive time as the rightful 
holder of Kampuchea's seat if that regime in fact had been broad-
ened by the presence of other anti-Vietnamese factions in 
Kampuchea. 25 
Son Sann, leader of the "Khmer People's National Liberation 
Front" (KPNLF), with a claimed following of about 9,000 in 
Kampuchea and Thai refugee camps, proved another major stum-
bling block to the holding of the Singapore conference. Initially, on 
August 23, while referring to pre-conference statements made re-
cently by Democratic Kampuchea's leaders, Son Sann claimed that 
he could not accept the Sampan regime's insistence that it alone was 
Kampuchea's "sole and legitimate state." He asserted that each 
Kampuchean faction maintain its own "political individuality" and 
"freedom of action" in the future united front. In tum, Son Sann's 
own demands seemed hardly calculated to win Democratic 
Kampuchea's adhesion. These demands included: (1) KPNLF con-
trol of all chief ''united front" leadership or future Ministerial posts; 
(2) exile for "all leaders compromised" by the Sampan-Pot regime's 
atrocities in Kampuchea in the 1975-79 period; and, (3) arms and 
other aid to the KPNLF to make it equal in strength to "Democratic 
Kampuchea's" forces. So insistently did Son Sann voice his de-
mands that at one point any prospect of convening the conference 
seemed doomed. Only a reported Thai government threat to end its 
aid to Sann, and a personal appeal by Malaysia's Foreign Affairs 
Minister to San "to stop obstructing the formation of a coalition 
front," seem to have persuaded the KPNLF leader to come to the 
Singapore conference table. Remarks during the Singapore confer-
ence by the mercurial Norodom Sihanouk that he too had only re-
luctantly agreed to come to Singapore to join in discussion with his 
"warmongering" colleagues, did not improve the atmosphere 
either.26 
Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that, as in the 
25. Henry Kamm, "Pol Pot Group Unyielding at Talks," The New York Times, Sep-
tember 13, 1981, at A6, col. 1. 
26. The Bangkok Post, August 26, 1981; Agence France Presse dispatch, Singapore, 
September 5, 1981 (FBIS, September 15, 1981); Radio Kuala Lampur, August 25, 1981 
(FBIS, August 27, 1981). 
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case of the New York conference on Kampuchea, the Singapore 
meeting sought refuge in ambiguous generalities. The Singapore 
conference communique issued on September 4, 1981, declared that ' 
the participants "express the desire to form a coalition government 
of Democratic Kampuchea," in order to continue the struggle 
against Vietnamese occupation forces. A mere expression of a "de-
sire" hardly seemed a very categorical formulation to most observ-
ers. There also had been a complete failure at the Singapore 
conference to agree on the means of organizing either the united 
front or the proposed coalition government. Hence the participants 
in their communique merely decided to "set up an ad hoc committee 
to study the principles and forms" to bring the coalition about. The 
least controversial feature of the Singapore conference document 
was its appeal to all "peace-loving nations" to support the resolu-
tions on Kampuchea passed by the United Nations. Characteristic 
of existing relations between Khieu Sampan, Sihanouk and Son 
Sann was an agreement in the Singapore conference communique to 
"avoid clashes among themselves" and to "refrain from bringing to 
the public" their mutual differences during the period of the 
agreement. 
In any event, some relatively low key quarrelling soon erupted 
among the Singapore conference participants. Son Sann, apparently 
under pressure from his KPNLF followers, insisted that he would 
continue to press his demand for leadership dominance of the pro-
posed coalition. Some of Son Sann's followers appeared to have dif-
ficulty in particular with the Singapore conference's formulation that 
the proposed coalition would bear the name "Democratic 
Kampuchea" government, i.e., the name of the Khieu Sampan-Pol 
Pot faction. Already by September 13 "Democratic Kampuchea" 
was complaining of certain remarks and actions" by other partici-
pants. It rejected particularly the veracity of "some reports" which 
indicated that Son Sann had been appointed premier of the coalition 
government, or would attend the forthcoming UN General Assem-
bly meeting as "Democratic Kampuchea's" representative. 27 Mean-
while an "ad hoc" committee composed of representatives of the 
KPNLF, Sihanouk, and of "Democratic Kampuchea" had begun 
meeting in Bangkok, even as the UN General Assembly on Septem-
ber 18, 1981 once again beat back a Vietnamese-Soviet drive to un-
seat the Sampan-Pot regime and replace it with Heng Samrin's PRK. 
Beyond an agreement "in principle" to have Sihanouk assume the 
27. Xinhua dispatch, Beijing, September 13, 1981 (FBIS, September 15, 1981). 
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presidency of the "Democratic Kampuchean" coalition government, 
the "united front" conferees appeared to have increasing difficulty in 
finding a common ground. 
Toward the close of 1981, these Bangkok discussions, like the 
Singapore conference and the UN-sponsored New York conference 
before it, seemed to many observers to be so many exercises in futil-
ity. There were good reasons for such an impression. Denunciation 
of the Singapore conference and of the continuing UN recognition of 
the Sampan-Pot regime kept pouring from Indochina's capitals and 
Moscow, seemingly reflected further policy rigidification. On Octo-
ber 21, 1981, the United Nations General Assembly, in a new 
ASEAN-sponsored resolution, endorsed the decisions of the New 
York conference and called once more for the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. In Indochinese circles this re-
newed UN call met with the expected vitriolic reaction, and Radio 
Phnom Penh, on October 23, 1981 dismissed the General Assembly's 
resolution as "null and void." LPDR media, after first lashing out at 
the "tragic play" of the New York conference on Kampuchea, lik-
ened the "farce" of the Singapore meeting to an "assembly of horses 
from different stables," always bent on destroying each other, and 
undoubtedly leading "their masters," Washington and Beijing, to 
failure. A PRK commentary saw the New York and Singapore 
meetings as but a "series of dry and tasteless comedies," declaring 
the proposed Kampuchean "united front" to be "dead even before it 
was born," because "from the hangmen of the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime," to the "millionaire Son San," and to the "ca-
pricious Prince Sihanouk" each desired only his exclusive return to 
power over the Kampuchean people. To Hanoi, the "united front" 
aspirants were but "lackeys," whose "strings" were being pulled by 
the United States and the People's Republic of China. According to 
a Vietnamese broadcast, though Beijing today is trying by all possi-
ble means, including presumably the staging of international gather-
ings, to legitimize the Democratic Kampuchea re~ime, nothing can 
wipe out the "genocide" of the "Pol Pot clique."2'8 
Behind Hanoi's critical facade, however, there was developing a 
more conciliatory policy, as we have seen, toward a "broadening" of 
the Heng Samrin regime, as was explained to Suharto's emissary, 
General Murdani.29 
28. Radio Phnom Penh, August 30, 1981; Siang Pasason (Vientiane), September 10, 
1981; VNA dispatch, Hanoi, September 6, 1981; Radio Hanoi, September 10, 1981 (all in 
FBIS, September 1, 8, 11, and 14, 1981). 
29. See note 15 supra. 
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II. THE POLICIES OF THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS 
A somewhat similar paradox was developing in the Soviet posi-
tion, which prompts a consideration also of the policies of the other 
superpowers in the Kampuchean question. Officially, Moscow has 
maintained its hard line.3° From this official point of view Moscow's 
policy toward the Kampuchean question revolves around three prin-
ciples. First of all, there is in reality no Kampuchean "problem." A 
"non-existent" Kampuchean problem, however, has been created by 
US and Chinese "strategists," according to Moscow, with the aid of 
certain ASEAN governments who have ')oined in the intrigue" be-
cause of "pressure" from Washington and Beijing. Thus, Thailand 
is charged by the Soviets with giving aid to "Pol Pot supporters" and 
other "counterrevolutionary elements." It is important to keep in 
mind, according to Moscow, the context of this artificially manufac-
tured "Kampuchean problem." That context is China's internation-
ally aggressive designs, e.g. "fanning tension" of the Vietnam-LPDR 
border, and waging all-out psychological war "against the Indochina 
states." 
Second, according to the Soviet Union, the Heng Samrin gov-
ernment is the "lawful government," of the Khmer people, "effi-
ciently wielding power" over the entire national territory of the 
PRK. It has its own "legally elected parliament" and functioning 
constitution. Hence, the New York and Singapore conferences con-
stituted a "gross interference" in the internal affairs of the sovereign 
PRK state. The international legitimacy of the PRK is not in ques-
tion either, according to the Soviets, because the PRK "has already 
been recognized by over 30 states and national liberation move-
ments," and its "international prestige is growing." 
Third, whatever differences there may be in the Southeast Asian 
region, these can and should be settled on the basis of the "peace-
loving and constructive" proposal put forward on January 28, 1981 
by the Indochina s~ates to hold a regional conference of ASEAN and 
the Indochina countries.31 Soviet commentators say that during 
meetings held in Moscow during the first two weeks of September 
1981 with visiting PRK premier Pen Sovan, LPDR premier Kaysone 
Phomvihan, and SRV party secretary general Le Duan, Soviet Presi-
dent Leonid Brezhnev had emphasized that "implementation" of the 
30. See, e.g., lzvestiya (Moscow), September 20, 1981 (morning edition) and Sotsialis-
ticheskaya Industriya (Moscow), September 5, 1981 (FBIS, September 16 and 30, 1981). 
31. See note 11 supra. 
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regional conference proposal would certainly enhance prospects for 
peace in Southeast Asia. 
Yet, in Moscow as in Hanoi, there were more conciliatory per-
spectives. Whatever Soviet media may have been reporting about 
Moscow's support for the Indochinese proposal for a regional con-
ference with ASEAN only, the Soviet President in his September, 
1981 meetings with Indochinese leaders also appears to have been 
urging a new policy of restraint in the Kampuchean problem. 32 
Brezhnev notably avoided direct criticism of ASEAN in his discus-
sions and urged his Indochinese allies to "keep the dialogue going" 
with ASEAN. Both Brezhnev and Le Duan, at the conclusion of 
their talks, voiced a "readiness to establish and strengthen relations 
of friendship and cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia and all 
peaceloving countries. ' 033 
The singling out of Malaysia and Indonesia was particularly 
noteworthy. It will be recalled that among ASEAN members these 
are precisely the two states most interested in considering Vietnam as 
a strategic buffer against a possible regional expansion by a resur-
gent and modernizing post-Mao China. That interest crystallized in 
the "Kuantan principle"34 and it appeared that Brezhnev in his Sep-
tember, 1981 meetings with the leaders of the "Indochina unity bloc" 
was well aware of the possible tactical advantage to the Soviets that 
the "Kuantan principle" and a conciliatory approach offered. As 
one Bangkok editorial pointed out, avoiding a deepening polariza-
tion over Kampuchea, and perhaps having to counter a new Chinese 
move against Vietnam as well, might appear especially desirable to 
Moscow at a time when the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was 
not proceeding very smoothly; when the Polish problem loomed 
larger almost every day; and, when Reagan-Haig foreign policy reac-
tions in the United States could not be gauged very accurately.35 
It can hardly have been coincidental that the idea of a "broad-
ened" Heng Samrin government was mooted to Suharto's emissary 
General Murdani36 at about the same time that Brezhnev was dis-
cussing the Kampuchean question with Le Duan in the Kremlin. 
Equally telling was the statement by SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Co Thach on September 14, 1981, on the eve of the UN General 
32. See Chanda, supra note 9. 
33. Ibid 
34. See note 7 supra. 
35. Editorial, "Changing Hanoi Attitude Fits Soviet Strategy," Nation Review (Bang-
kok), September 18, 1981. 
36. See note 15 supra. 
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Assembly opening. In this statement Thach unexpectedly supported 
ASEAN's 1971 concept of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" 
in Southeast Asia as constituting "a solid basis for negotiations" on 
the Kampuchean question, although such negotiations, again, ac-
cording to Thach, had to be held on a "regional" level. To ASEAN's 
(and the UN's) demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Kampuchea, Thach now also countered with a new gambit of his 
own: a call for a cessation of all "direct or indirect interference and 
threats" in the Southeast Asian area by foreign powers, and a de-
mand for the ''withdrawal of all foreign troops from Southeast 
Asia.'m By this call, Thach managed to link the solution of the 
Kampuchean question to a "genuine" neutrality, in which military 
ties by individual ASEAN states to Western powers (e.g. the Philip-
pines and the United States; and Malaysia and Singapore to the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, under the Five 
Power Commonwealth Defense Arrangement) were made insepara-
ble from the withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Kampuchea. To 
what extent the adverse - for Hanoi and Moscow - UN General 
Assembly vote on Kampuchea on October 22, 1981 may have damp-
ened Hanoi's interest, and yet, prodded by Moscow, compelled Ha-
noi to keep "the dialogue" with ASEAN going on these points, 
remains to be seen. 
Meanwhile, the Soviets have other strategic considerations in 
the Kampuchean crisis. For one thing, the Kampucheans under 
Heng Samrin's regime, are restive under Vietnam's heavy military 
and political dominance of their country. Pen Sovan, secretary gen-
eral of the ruling People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea has 
begun to de-emphasize his country's "special relationship" with the 
SRV and the role played by Hanoi in the Kampuchean "liberation" 
struggle and has begun to stress as well that the unity of the Indo-
china states is on the same footing as Phnom Penh's bilateral solidar-
ity with Moscow. The numbers of Kampuchean military and 
civilians being trained in the Soviet Union is growing. And Moscow 
is clearly interested in enlarging its own direct strategic base in the 
PRK, (e.g. through the development of Kampuchea's Kompong Som 
harbor where currently some 30 Soviet technicians are at work). The 
number of Soviet personnel in Kampuchea has grown from 40 in 
March, 1980 to about 400 in June, 1981, and "a steady flow of Soviet 
delegations" to Phnom Penh as well as the opening of a "technical 
university" in Phnom Penh in September, 1981 staffed entirely by 
37. Renmin Ribao (Beijing), September 17, 1981 (FBIS, September 18, 1981). 
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Soviet experts, reflect what appears to be a PRK. ''tilt" to Moscow.38 
It is unlikely that this "tilt" will at any time soon align the So-
viet Union, the SRV, and Heng Samrin's PRK. against each other. 
But the deepening Soviet commitment to the PRK., a state which 
Hanoi has tended to view and treat as its satrapy, suggests that Mos-
cow, even at the risk of straining its relations with Vietnam, is seek-
ing to balance and more evenly spread its influence in Indochina. It 
has been noted that by its SRV alliance the Soviets, in a way, "en-
trapped" themselves in the present Sino-Vietnam conflict. Hence, 
"Moscow's restraint during the February-March, 1979 Sino-Vietnam 
border war may have been a signal that Soviet forces were not at the 
disposal of Vietnam's policymakers. "39 The further development of 
an independent Soviet commitment to Heng Samrin's PRK. reflects 
Moscow's realization of the dangers of its heavy support for the 
SRV, as well as its determination that whatever the ultimate settle-
ment of the Kampuchean question may be, Soviet interests in the 
country will be protected. 
Beijing's official position also may be summarized under three 
basic categories.40 First, Beijing is basically supportive of the UN's 
and ASEAN's position that Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea is un-
acceptable (a "military and colonial rule" based on "200,000 aggres-
sor troops," as Chinese media put it). The Chinese also claim to 
support the UN demand that after the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces Kampucheans be permitted to hold free elections under UN 
supervision. In fact, however, as Chinese policy at the New York 
conference showed, Beijing's chief concern appears to be to protect 
the Kampan-Pot regime, even at the risk of alienating ASEAN. 
Second, according to the PRC, the Vietnamese presence in 
Kampuchea is but part of a broader strategy of "regional hegemon-
ism" by Hanoi supported by Moscow. Indeed, the aggressive pursuit 
of Soviet-Vietnamese "common hegemonist goals" is seen by China 
as the "root cause of turbulence" throughout the Southeast Asian 
region. Through Vietnam and her Kampuchean conquest, accord-
ing to Beijing, the Soviets are further advancing in "encircling" 
China. Hanoi's proposal to ASEAN to hold a "regional" conference 
to discuss common problems, including Kampuchea, is perceived by 
Beijing as but a part of this "hegemonist" strategy, as a result of 
38. Nayan Chanda in Tile Straights Times, June 9, 1981. 
39. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeat Asia: Interests, Goals, and 
Constraints," Orbis, Spring, 1981, p. 62. 
40. Mu Youlin, "Peace in Southeast Asia," Beijing Review, October 5, 1981, p. 3, and 
An Ding, "No to Regional Conference," Befjing Review, June l, 1981, p. II. 
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which not only Kampuchea, but also Laos ("now entirely controlled 
by Vietnam") have fallen under Vietna~'s sway. Hanoi's aggression 
also extends itself to the People's Republic of China, as testified to 
by allegedly numerous violations of its Chinese frontier in the past 
three years. Third, precisely because of her confrontation with Ha-
noi over Kampuchea, ·Beijing has felt constrained again and again to 
emphasize her peaceful intentions toward Southeast Asia, and, in-
deed, toward the SR V itself. China "does not wish to establish a 
sphere of influence in Southeast Asia," nor "does it wish to bring 
about the collapse of Vietnam."41 In accordance with this position, 
Beijing today accuses Hanoi of falsely trumpeting that the region 
faces a "Chinese threat," in the hope of thereby "intimidating" the 
ASEAN countries. Ieng Sary, Deputy Premier for Foreign Affairs of 
Beijing's client, "Democratic Kampuchea," in his September 29, 
1981 UN General Assembly address, characterized Hanoi's "Chi-
nese threat" gambit as but a "resort to the odious thief-crying-stop-
thief strategem."42 
In analyzing Beijing's position in the Kampuchean question, 
one is particularly struck by the increasing difficulty that position 
poses for China's relations with her Southeast Asian neighbors. For 
as China's confrontation with a Moscow-backed SRV has continued, 
Beijing no longer relies (or feels that she can rely) primarily on the 
Sampan-Pot guerrilla regime. Rather, as has been noted, Beijing has 
also attempted ''to enlist the A SEAN and all anti-Vietnamese 
Cambodian forces in the areas as a whole."43 Such a mobilization of 
ASEAN and anti-Vietnamese Kampucheans to "bleed Vietnam" (as 
some ASEAN cj.rcles have charged),44 and perhaps even provoke a 
drastic change i'n Hanoi that might result in a less avowedly pro-
Soviet government there, is clearly in Beijing's interest. But this Chi-
nese strategy, as is evident, is already producing adverse results. 
ASEAN states, along with their persistent denunciation of the 
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea, and their pressure at the 
United Nations to maintain international recognition of "Demo-
cratic Kampuchea", have also made it plain that they do not see the 
latter as a desirable permanent Cambodian government. While Beij-
41. Mu Youlin, note 40 supra, p. 3. 
42. Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (clandestine), October 2, 1981 (FBIS, October 
5, 1981). 
43. Lo Shi-fu, "Peiping's Current Strategy Toward Cambodia," Issues and Studies, 
May, 1981, P- 68. 
44. q: the interview of Singapore's deputy premier (foreign affairs), S. Rajaratnam 
in Le Figaro (Paris), March 12, 1980. 
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ing, as in the case of the July 13, 1981 New York conference, blocks 
policy formulations that might endanger the Sampan-Pot regime's 
de facto control over whatever free elections might eventually be 
held in Kampuchea, ASEAN is equally certain that it wants both the 
Heng Samrin and Kampan-Pot leadership replaced. 
This ASEAN objective is tied to another concern evident among 
at least two ASEAN members, Indonesia and Malaysia, that the real 
threat to their region in the long-term comes more from China than 
from VietD.fim. Such a view is, curren~ly at least, not generally popu-
lar in Thailand, which as a "frontline state," values China's support 
in Bangkok's tense border and refugee relations with a Hanoi-domi-. 
nated LPDR and PRK. But it has found sympathy, if less than 
avowed endorsement, in political-military circles in the Philippines 
and Singapore. In the aftermath ofthe July, 1981 New York confer-
ence, which saw the ASEAN-Chinese rift over Kampuchean policy 
more openly revealed than it perhaps had ever been before, Malay-
sia's new premier Mahathir bin Mohammad and his associates be-
came equally open and candid about their own threat perceptions. 
Thus, early in August 1981, during a Djakarta visit, Mahathir 
said publicly that he did not regard Vietnam as a dangerous threat to 
Southeast Asia, adding that in his judgment the SR V did not intend 
to invade ASEAN, nor that Hanoi after decades of fighting "will 
have much time for adventures outside of "Vietnam." In subsequent 
weeks Malaysian officials, both during Chinese premier Zhao 
Ziyang's visit to Kuala Lampur and in discussions in Bangkok, 
strongly voiced their disapproval of China's allegedly continuing 
support for the insurgent Communist Party of Malaya. Indeed, by 
mid-August 1981, Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali 
Shafie declared that his government considered the Chinese Com-
munist Party's link with the Communist parties in Southeast Asia to 
be a greater danger than that coming from the Soviet Union. As 
Mahathir again put it in a Bangkok visit, "It is well-know that my 
own political party has no counterpart in China and has no intention 
of interfering in Chinese domestic affairs." Mahathir went on to say 
that "This idea that you can have both party-to-party and govern-
ment-to-government relations is not really acceptable to us."45 
More than a year earlier, in January 1980, then Malaysian For-
eign Minister Rithauddeen, after a Hanoi visit, had already declared 
45. Asiaweek (Hong Kong), September 4, 1981, p. 14. See also Radio Kuala 
Lampur, August 15, 1981 (FBIS, August 18, 1981); K. Das, ''Threat? What Threat?," 
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 113, no. 35, Aug. 21, 1981), pp. 13-14. 
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that ASEAN should accept Vietnam's assurance that it had no terri-
torial ambition over Thailand or any other ASEAN country.46 In 
Djakarta, at about the same time, the outgoing Indonesian ambassa-
dor to the SRV, Hardi, said that he too was convinced that Vietnam 
was ready for friendly relations with ASEAN once the Kampuchean 
question was out of the way. These Malaysian-Indonesian percep-
tions further evolved into the relatively accommodating posture of 
the "Kuantan principle" later that year.47 And despite new ASEAN-
Vietnamese tensions in subsequent months, the concept of an 
ASEAN accommodation with the SRV, which would include a rec-
ognition of Vietnam's security interests in Laos and Kampuchea, has 
remained basic to Malaysia's regional policy. In August 1981, at the 
time that Malaysia's new premier Mahathir was downgrading the 
Vietnamese danger, his cabinet colleagues, deputy premier Musa bin 
Hitam and Foreign Minister Ghazali bin Shafie, accentuated the his-
toric importance of Hanoi's struggle for independence, and, indeed, 
drew parallels between the SRV's position in Indochina and Indone-
sia's role in ASEAN. As one analysis put it at the time:48 
The Malaysian leadership is ready to recognize a major 
Vietnamese role in Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambo-
dia and Loas, rather than insist, as does China, on unremit-
ting hostility toward Vietnam. While Mr. Musa and Mr. 
Ghazali condemned the Vietnamese occupation of Cambo-
dia, they also spoke sympathetically of Vietnam's struggle 
for national survival. Mr Ghazali said that Vietnam was 
entitled to play toward Laos and Cambodia a role similar 
to that played by Indonesia towards its partners in the 
Southeast Asian group - that of the biggest country in the 
group. 'The anchor,' the Foreign Minister said, 'but not the 
dominant power.' 
The present writer has heard similar remarks from various In-
donesian quarters, with the added observation, as one Indonesian 
diplomatonce put it, that "the Indonesians and the Vietnamese are 
the only peoples in Southeast Asia that won their independence 
through a revolutionary independence struggle against colonialism. 
That alone should make us sympathetic to each other." One need 
not be taken in by all such rhetoric to realize, nevertheless, that in its 
46. The Strait.r Times, January 15, 1980. 
47. See note 7 supra. 
48. Henry Kamm, "Malaysians Depict China as a Threat," The New York Times, 
August 23, 1981, at A17, col. 1. 
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Kampuchean policy today, the People's Republic of China is begin-
ning seriously to alienate ASEAN. 
Equally important, in pursuit of its Kampuchean policy, China, 
particularly on the international scene, has become dependent on US 
leverage in Third World (including ASEAN) and Western nations. 
As previously noted, the Sino-US entente in Kampuchean policy 
was particularly evident at the July 1981 New York conference on 
Kampuchea, where, reportedly, "behind the scenes United States 
diplomats labored for China's cause, eager to cement the new rela-
tionship with Peking (Beijing)"49 and thus successfully prevented 
any conference policy conclusions that could damage the Sampan-
Pot regime. This full US commitment to Beijing, despite ASEAN 
disquiet, was accompanied by US expressions of strong concern for 
ASEAN's interests. 
For example, at the very time of the July 1981 UN conference 
on Kampuchea, the US Assistant Secretary of state for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, John H. Holdridge, was testifying to the East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the US Senate's Foreign 
Relations Committee. According to Holdridge, "the heart" of US 
policy in "the entire region" of Southeast Asia is American support 
for the "progress and stability" of ASEAN. Total US trade with 
ASEAN's "rapidly expanding economies," according to Holdridge, 
now amounts to $21 billion annually, and for strategic as well as 
economic reasons regular consultations with ASEAN ("a cohesive, 
effective organization") have become a standard feature of American 
foreign policy. The "positive, active support" of the United States 
for ASEAN, Holdridge said, is considered by Washington to be ''the 
most effective means of curbing the ambitions of Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union" in the region. Specifically as to the Kampuchean 
question, Holdridge portrayed ASEAN and the United States to be 
"in full agreement" on a policy of making Hanoi's occupation of 
Kampuchea as costly as possible through "diplomatic isolation and 
economic deprivation." Such a policy would be most likely to in-
duce the Vietnamese to end their Kampuchean presence. 50 At the 
July 1981 New York conference on Kampuchea, US Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig further sharpened the US formulation of a fa-
vored solution to the Kampuchean problem. On the basis of a resto-
ration of Cambodian "self-determination" and sovereignty, and of 
49. Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.N. Carries Moderation to Extreme," The New York 
Times, September 20, 1981, at E4, col. 1. 
50. "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia," Current Policy (U.S. Department of State, Bu-
reau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.), no. 295, July, 1981, pp. 1-3. 
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establishment there of a government that would be representative of 
"the wishes of the Khmer people," Haig said that a "neutral Cambo-
dia that represents no threat to any of its neighbors" would not only 
"remove the main cause of conflict" in Southeast Asia but also 
would contribute to an easing of "global tensions."51 
In analyzing the US position, one may note in passing the possi-
bility of an internal contradiction, i.e. a Kampuchean government 
reflecting the "wishes of the Khmer people", as Haig put it, might 
not desire necessarily to be "neutral." But more likely to have been 
troubling in ASEAN circles was Holdridge's avowal of US support 
for ASEAN as being the "most effective means" to stop Hanoi's and 
Moscow's ambitions in Southeast Asia, and his claim of the existence 
of a "full" US-ASEAN agreement on the means of persuading Ha-
noi to withdraw its Kampuchean contingents. Long before Hol-
dridge's remarks, there had come to prevail in some ASEAN circles, 
e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia, a belief in the desirability of a "polit-
ical solution" of the Kampuchean problem on the basis of some ac-
commodation of Hanoi's security interests, i.e. the "Juantan 
principle." Was this party of the "full agreement" which the United 
States had with ASEAN? 
There was an even more disturbing question. Should Hol-
dridge's words that support for ASEAN was for the United States 
the "most effective means" of curbing Hanoi's and Moscow's poli-
cies, be taken to mean that Washington intended to use ASEAN as 
the cutting edge of its own policy of confrontation and containment 
of the Soviets? There were indications that the United States meant 
just that. While flying on the US Secretary of State's plane from 
Beijing to the fourteenth ASEAN ministerial meeting in Manila, on 
June 16, 1981, a "senior official" in the Haig party told accompany-
ing reporters that Haig believed that Asian non-Communist nations, 
like ASEAN, already had formed a concensus against the Soviet 
Union," and indeed, even were "ahead" of the United States "in rec-
ognizing the danger posed by the Soviet Union and its allies."52 It 
was added that presumably because of this recognition, the United 
States, therefore, would not have to play a leading role herself in 
opposing the Soviet threat in the region, though it would, of course, 
still be "sympathetic and supportive" of the non-Communist Asian 
nations. 
51. "Excerpts from Speech by Haig," The New York Times, July 14, 1981, at AS, col. 
I. 
52. UPI dispatch by Jim Anderson, Manila, June 17, 1981. 
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But how comfortable would ASEAN be in this US-conceived 
vanguard role of Communist confrontation? As in the case of 
ASEAN's differences with Beijing over the Kampuchean issue there 
has been no public, official expression of dissent in ASEAN capitals, 
nor is there likely to be for some time. But as was the case with 
China, the ASEAN policy differences in the United States have not 
gone unnoticed. At the Manila conference in June 1981 the ASEAN 
ministers had attempted to give some substance to their "Third Al-
ternative" strategy.5 The strategy made room for Hanoi's interests, 
including a negotiating process involving the SRV, the Soviet Union 
and all other "interested" parties, as well as UN-supervised elections 
in Kampuchea in which all factions, including the Heng Samrin re-
gime's followers, would have had an opportunity to make their case. 
However, the very hardline position adopted by Secretary Haig to-
ward Vietnam, first during his Beijing visit and then the following 
week at the Manila conference, greatly disconcerted ASEAN's repre-
sentatives in the Philippine capital. Haig's stance in the Kampuche-
an question was described as a "very, very close parallel" of China's. 
Assertions both by Haig and Assistant Secretary Holdridge that 
pressure on Vietnam should be maximized including in unspecified 
"military" ways, and that Beijing should increase its arms deliveries 
to anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, all deepened fears in 
ASEAN circles that "a confrontationist approach would drive Viet-
nam deeper into Moscow's arms and make a political solution more 
difficult." 54 
It should be emphasized, moreover, that ASEAN fears of China 
were well known to US officials even as their general policy of 
closely following Beijing's lead in the Kampuchean question were 
exacerbating those ASEAN fears. For example, in his earlier men-
tioned July 1981 testimony before the US Senate's subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Holdridge conceded under question-
ing by subcommittee members that, within ASEAN, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja had voiced concern over 
Secretary Haig's announcement, made during Haig's June 1981 Beij-
ing visit, that the United States was now prepared to consider arms 
sales to China.55 Indeed, shortly after Haig's announcement, 
Kusumaatmadja complained that there had been no prior consulta-
tion with ASEAN on the matter, adding that "it would have been a 
53. See note 18 supra. 
54. Nayan Chanda, "Haig Turns the Screw," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 
1981, p. 10. 
55. The Straits Times, July 17, 1981. 
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sign of their [i.e. the United States') regard for us," had Washington 
done so. 56 And US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard 
Armitage, on July 21, 1981, in testimony before the same Senate sub-
committee, acknowledged "long standing Southeast Asian concerns" 
about China, adding that ''we have given assurances that our devel-
oping relations with China will not be at the expense of our 
friends." 57 
To ASEAN, however, it may well seem that such assurances are 
belied by US policy actions, and that, moreover, the United States 
feels confident that it can take ASEAN more or less for granted. To 
a degree and for the moment, such US confidence may well seem 
justified. In the present polarized condition of Southeast Asian di-
plomacy, ASEAN states are tied to the United States and/or to its 
Commonwealth allies by a variety of military agreements and ac-
commodations. Hence ASEAN hardly seems to be in a position 
strongly and openly to voice objections to the US approach in the 
Kampuchean question. The more so, because both the United States 
and ASEAN fundamentally agree on the basic objective: a with-
drawal of Vietnamese forces and establishment of an alternative re-
gime in Kampuchea. But despite common goals, even differences in 
tactics may spoil alliances, and the current US-ASEAN interplay 
over Kampuchea is beginning to do just that. 
Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Common-
wealth nations in Africa and Asia in various degrees have begun to 
develop reservations similar to ASEAN's that a hardline anti-
Vietnamese policy is likely to achieve results. Many in this group 
too have strong military and other strategic interdependencies with 
the United States. None is prepared to go as far as India and extend 
outright recognition to the Heng Samrin regime. To most US allies, 
rather, it seems that the idea of a compromise-oriented "political so-
lution" in Kampuchea - arrived at, to be sure, with a judicious 
combination of inducements and pressures on Hanoi to change 
course -is more likely to be productive in the long run than a seem-
ingly hardline "confrontationist" approach alone. 
Ill. THE PROSPECTS OF CONTENDING FACTIONS 
IN KAMPUCHEA 
What such a carrot and stick approach might include, will be 
suggested shortly. First it seems appropriate, however, to look 
56. Agence France Presse dispatch, Manila, June 19, 1981 (FBIS, June 19, 1981). 
57. UPI dispatch, Washington, July 22, 1981. 
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briefly at the contending factions in Kampuchea today. There is lit-
tle question that backed by the ubiquitous presence of some 200,000 
Vietnamese troops, and some three thousand Vietnamese civilian 
troops, and some three thousand Vietnamese civilian "advisers" and 
party cadres, Heng Samrin, as President of the "Kampuchean Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Council Government" (KPRCG) and of its ma-
jor political mass movement, the "Kampuchean National United 
Front for National Salvation" (KNUFNS), can with various degrees 
of justification claim control over about 90 percent of Kampuchean 
national territory. This control, especially in the countryside, is in-
termittent however, and dependent on guerrilla activity. During 
1981, there was increasing evidence of growing insecurity. The gov-
ernment designated as "trouble zones" (i.e. areas where anti-Viet-
nam resistance is active) areas not just in the Southwest, East and 
Northeast regions where insurgents of the Kampan-Pot regime are 
active, but also in Kratie and Kompong Cham in the East Central 
region, and Takeo and Kampot in the South.58 
A basic party structure is in place and appears to be functioning 
effectively. Through its network of "people's revolutionary commit-
tees" in villages and towns, the ruling People's Revolutionary Party 
(PRP) organized elections for both regional councils and a National 
Assembly in March and Aprill981. In May, at its national congress, 
the PRP elected Hanoi's confidant, Vice President and Defense Min-
ister Pen Sovan, as its general secretary, and adopted an ambitious 
national reconstruction program. Though Samrin has been pro-
claiming that "during a little more than two years, from scratch, we 
have achieved great and fundamental successes in shoring up the 
economic structure" and "stabilizing daily life,"59 the PRK's 
problems of future survival remain formidable. Though rice pro-
duction is said to have risen from 400,000 tons in 1979 to a claimed 
750,000 in 1980, at least a million tons is required for self-suffi-
ciency.60 Heng Samrin's Kampuchea has continued need of huge 
imports of food. PRP-led production "solidarity groups" (i.e. coop-
eratives) in the villages have avoided doctrinaire or highly regulated 
cultivation and marketing procedures (individual or family land 
ownership prevails) and private peasant initiative has been permitted 
to spur production growth. But the still shattered infrastructure of 
services seriously inhibits adequate food distribution and economic 
58. Bernard Estrade dispatch, Agence France Presse, Phnom Penh, March 26, 1981 
(FBIS, March 26, 1981). 
59. Radio Phnom Penh, April 30, 1981 (FBIS, May 4, 1981). 
60. Estrade dispatch, note 58, supra. 
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recovery generally. "Kampuchea is still a graveyard of smashed cit-
ies, towns, markets, roads, bridges, telecommunications and other es-
sential facilities of a modem state," one recent visitor noted, and 
"urban reconstruction has hardly begun even in Phnom Penh."61 
In order to retain its party cadre, military and bureaucratic loy-
alties, the Heng Samrin regime has been subsidizing heavily the cost 
of the tens of thousands of rice p~rchased at artificially high prices 
from peasant producers and "solidarity groups."62 Reorganization 
of food production, some control over the illegal trade and black 
marketeering with Thailand, introduction of a new tax system to pay 
for essential services (public utilities, health services and much pub-
lic transport in Phnom Penh and other towns has been free), and 
preparation for the expected and inevitable drop in United Nations 
food relief, which amounted to nearly $700 million worth from 1979 
through 1981, all depend to some degree on public support for and 
confidence in the Heng Samrin regime among the 6 million 
Kampuchean population (in 1975 the population was estimated at 
8.1 million). 
One sign that such public confidence exists is the fact that, ac-
cording to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 
300,000 Kampucheans who in the course of 1978-79 had fled their 
country to seek refuge in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, had returned 
to their country by the end of 1980. Indeed, according to officials of 
international relief agencies, the number of returnees actually is 
closer to 500,000.63 With UNHCR assistance, refugees have re-
turned to their home villages, particularly in such frontier provinces 
as Battambang and Siem Reap in the West, and Prey V eng in the 
East. In early October 1981, however, according to the Thai mili-
tary's Supreme Command Information Office, there were still some 
120,000 Kampuchean refugees in Thai camps, of which about 30,000 
were awaiting resettlement in third countries.64 
Still, to most Kampucheans today the Vietnamese-controlled 
Heng Samrin regime remains preferable by far to the "Democratic 
Kampuchea" underground remnant of Khieu Sampan and Pol Pot. 
For Kampucheans the seemingly excessively bloody violence of 
some recent guerrilla attacks by the Sampan-Pot forces reinforces 
61. Michael Richardson in The Asia Record, May, 1981, p. 12. 
62. Ibid 
63. UNHCR (Lausanne), October-November, 1980, no. 4, p. 2; Michael Richardson, 
"Time to Settle Down," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. Ill, no. 12 (March 13, 1981), 
p. 17. 
64. Voice of Free Asia, Bangkok, October 2, 1981 (FBJS, October 6, 1981). 
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the memory of the holocaust in the whole of the country unleashed 
by the Sampan-Pot government when in power during the 1975-79 
period. Then, too, while anti-Vietnamese feelings are traditional 
and endemic among Kampucheans, the SRV's military and bureau-
cratic establishment has been relatively unobtDisive and restrained 
in its relations with Kampucheans. According to "people's revolu-
tionary committee" spokesmen, the Vietnamese even are ''withdraw-
ing" from some public service sectors, such as health care, as 
Kampucheans themselves are able to take over. At the same time, 
however, as has been noted earlier, the direct Soviet presence in the 
PRK is beginning to loom larger. The degree to which that presence 
now equals or overshadows Hanoi's in popular Kampuchean antipa-
thies is difficult to determine. During their discussions in the Krem-
lin in mid-September 1981, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev 
assured Pen Sovan that Moscow would continue to assist the Heng 
Samrin regime "in building cases of socialism." Most Kampucheans 
are probably resigned that absent a general superpower agreement 
on a "Third Alternative" government, even a modified or "ex-
panded" Heng Samrin regime65 would probably allow for a contin-
ued and considerable Vietnamese and Soviet influence in their 
affairs. 66 
Were it not for Beijing's active support in weapons, money and 
diplomatic pressure in the international arena, it is doubtful if the 
"Democratic Kampuchea" government would last more than a few 
months, despite its legally strong case that it, and not the PRK, is 
Kampuchea's only legitimate government. Headquartered primarily 
in the Phnom Kravanh (Cardomom Mountain) range, and in West-
em Battambang province, "Democratic Kampuchea's" guerrilla 
commander Pol Pot is supplied with Chinese-financed weapons 
through the porous Thai-Kampuchean border. Senior Thai military, 
as well as Pol Pot sympathizers and recruiting agents among the 
human flotsam in the border refugee camps, facilitate the process. 
US-made weapons, captured from the forces of the deposed Lon Nol 
government in Phnom Penh also remain in use. Beijing finances as 
well "Democratic Kampuchea's" presence at the United Nations 
and its media. It was due to Beijing's pressure that Pot, who remains 
an odious figure internationally because of his role in the 
65. See note 15 supra. 
66. For data in this paragraph, see Radio Moscow, September 15, 1981 (FBIS, Sep-
tember 17, 1981), L'Humanite (Paris), March 30, 1981 (FBJS, April 16, 1981); Nayan 
Chanda, "Kampuchea's New Priorities," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. Ill, no. 8 
(Feb. 13, 1981), p. 15. 
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Kampuchean holocaust of 1975-79, formally resigned his premier-
ship in mid-1980, maintaining his post as military commander 
however. 
Small but well-equipped units of the Sampan-Pot "national 
army" now roam over an ever widening area of Kampuchea, estab-
lishing their own "revolutionary people's" committees in villages, 
. and becoming more effective in ambush and sudden night attacks. 
In April 1981, Sampan claimed that ''we have intensified our guer-
rilla warfare" in the entire country, "including Phnom Penh, 
Kompong Som town, provincial seats, railroads, highways, the 
Kampuchean-Vietnamese border and the Easterrl part of 
Kampuchea."67 The effectiveness of the Sampan-Pot insurgents is 
confirmed by other observers and the Heng Samrin regime itself.68 
On the other hand, "Democratic Kampuchea's" territorial base is 
small. While in Battambang it does control several scores of thinly 
populated, malaria-ridden villages, it holds no major population 
centers or even smaller towns. As a rival state, "Democratic 
Kampuchea's political economy, such as it is, is dependent on Chi-
nese largesse, the convoluted barter arrangements, smuggling, and 
extensive food and consumer good racketeering rampant in the Thai 
border towns and refugee camps. A glimpse of life in Phnoum Tani 
village in "Democratic Kampuchea" controlled territory is offered in 
one recent journalist's account:69 
The village people produce up to 40 per cent of their food 
needs . . . the rest they get from Thailand. As during the 
Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh money is non-exis-
tent. Barter is the only form of exchange except for occa-
sional frontier deals made by the most resourceful. Wood 
is the principal commodity in this trade. A sack of charcoal 
- the product of long hours of work - sells for just $1.50 
at the nearest Thai village, enough to buy batteries for a 
torch. At Phnoum Thnai village a carpenter with five 
workers manages to make and sell the occasional bed in 
Thailand for· $75, enabling him to buy food or new tools. 
Such entrepreneurs are allowed to keep and share out the 
profits, an official said . . . In between Khmer Rouge 
soldiers patrolling the jungle paths come regular 'convoys' 
67. Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (clandestine), April 14, 1981 (FBIS, April16, 
1981). 
68. See note 52 supra. 
69. Francis Deron, Agence France Presse dispatch, "With the Khmer Rouge," Cam-
bodia, February 11, 1981 in The Sarawak Tribune (Kuching), February 12, 1981. 
KAMPUCHEA 
of women, balancing sacks of rice, oil cans, foreign aid me-
dicaments or Chinese supplied ammunition on their heads. 
31 
According to "Democratic Kampuchea" officials, private ownership 
and payment for work are now said to exist side by side with tradi-
tional Khmer practices of sharing goods and work. Moreover, "na-
tional army" personnel during their spare time reportedly plant 
crops and help the peasantry.70 But even without the bloody brutal-
ity prevailing during Pol Pot's premiership, existence is confined to 
the narrowest of margins of survival. And except for the youthful, 
indeed teen-age, fanatics who compose much of the bulk ofthe cadre 
system and guerrilla forces, and who have never known anything 
else, life in "Democratic Kampuchea" today has few attractions and 
even fewer realistic prospects. 
There are two other major claimants to Kampuchean leader-
ship, i.e. the 70-year-old former premier Son Sann and his 
"Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's National Liberation Front" 
(KPNLF), and Cambodia's longtime ruler, Prince Norodom Siha-
nouk, and his "National Union Front for an Independent, Pacific 
and Cooperative Cambodia" (usually abbreviated to 
FUNCINPEC). On October 9, 1981, at a gathering held under the 
watchful eye of Thai military and intelligence personnel in the Thai 
border town of Ban Nong Chan, Son Sann celebrated the KPNLF's 
second anniversary. On this occasion Sann claimed that his armed 
fighters now numbered 9,000 and that his group had another 10,000 
armed supporters "operating inside Kampuchea." He also claimed 
the existence of "liberated territory" in Kampuchea under KPNLF 
control, with a population exceeding 100,000, that is "increasing 
every week."71 Independent observers, though conceding that sev-
eral hundred KNPLF recruiters are active throughout Western 
Kampuchea, tend to reduce these numbers by one-half to two-thirds. 
They also point out that much of the "liberated territory" Son Sann 
refers to consists of villages and refugee camps under the sometimes 
rapidly shifting control of local camp leaders or guerrilla chiefs. 
More permanent seems to be KPNLF's control over the Ban Samet 
and Nong Chan border encampments. 
As he had done before, Son Sann in his KPNLF anniversary 
address, criticized his fellow participants in the Bangkok "united 
front" organizational discussions then taking place. 72 According to 
70. The Asia Record, September, 1981, p. 13. 
71. The Bangkok Post, October 11, 1981. 
72. See note 27 supra. 
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Sann, the other representatives in the Bangkok talks were setting 
"harsh and unrealistic conditions." But he himself insisted that his 
KPNLF had to have majority control of a "united front" govern-
ment, and added that (though this matter "could be negotiated") 
"Democratic Kampuchea" leaders should go into "self exile" be-
cause their participation in a common government would alienate 
the Kampuchean people.73 
It should also be noted that there is no love lost between Siha-
nouk and Sann. The latter, reflecting conservative, anti-Communist 
Cambodian political currents in the 1960s, had opposed the Prince's 
accommodationist approach to the Vietnamese Communists and 
their Cambodian allies. There is little question that Sann and the 
KPNLF today have the quiet support of some powerful Thai Army 
regional commanders who reportedly supply them with weapons. 
The KPLNF also appears to be getting some arms from China from 
the connivance of Thai border officials. On July 24, 1980, a daring 
KPNLF raid on Prey Sar prison near Phnom Penh brought freedom 
to some 180 leading political prisoners. In subsequent months, ac-
cording to Thai sources, a number of other, smaller anit-Vietnam 
and anti-Pol Pot groups inside Kampuchea and along the Thai-
Kampuchean border joined the KPNLF.74 
But although the KPNLF has seasoned anti-Communist com-
bat veterans, among them chief of staff Dien Del, and although Son 
Sann's rigid, testy, integrity has won him widespread respect, Sann's 
age, lack of charisma, his feuding with other "Third Alternative" 
leaders like Sihanouk and Pol Pot, and his failure to develop signifi-
cant Chinese support, have greatly minimized his role. Sann has re-
peatedly criticized Khieu Sampan for failing to put Chinese aid to 
good military use. San also has charged that during repeated 
sojourns in Beijing, Chinese leaders said that they desired an anti-
Vietnamese united front, but could not afford to give the KPNLF 
any aid because of China's domestic economic difficulties.75 When 
asked in a press interview what his relations were with Sihanouk, 
Sann replied that "Now I only mind the problems of the people", 
and that "I do not have any time to waste."76 In many ASEAN cir-
cles, though he is admired as Cambodia's "Mr. Clean," as one Singa-
pore daily has put it. Sann is viewed, at best, as a transitional figure 
73. See note 71 supra. 
74. Ibid., September 3, 1980. 
75. The Straits Times, February 4, 1981. 
76. Ibid. 
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to a possible third alternative government, unless the United States 
would openly support him- an unlikely contingency. 
Already in 1979 it was authoritatively reported that Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk was the clear favorite among tens of thousands 
of Kampuchean refugees in and near Thailand and elsewhere to lead 
a possible "Third Alternative" movement. 77 Many Cambodians can 
look with some justification on Sihanouk's fall from power in 1970 
as the end of a relative "Golden Age" in their country's history, com-
pared to the horrors that were to visit Kampuchea in the following 
years. In the past decade, however, the Prince's volatile relations 
with Beijing, Pyongyang, and other potential friends and allies in the 
communist world, his well publicized vitriolic exchanges both with 
the Heng Samrin government and with that of Kieu Sampan, and his 
seemingly mercurial interest in participating in a broad anti-
Vietnamese alliance of Kampucheans, have tended to make him less 
and less effective. Also, there is no question that his personal popu-
larity among Kampucheans is still immense, and that remains a fac-
tor to be reckoned with in any lasting Kampuchean settlement. 
In September 1979, Sihanouk, then in Pyongyang, proclaimed a 
"Confederation of Nationalist Khmers." By the following month 
Sihanouk, while criticizing Son Sann for conducting a guerrilla cam-
paign from Thailand ''where he can be filmed by television cam-
eras," claimed that already some 5,000 Sihanoukist guerrillas 
actually were fighting the Vietnamese. 78 Yet, necessity drove him to 
serious discussions with the followers of Sampan and Sann, and the 
Prince, by February 1981, announced his readiness to preside over a 
"united front" movement, even one which was in effect led by Sam-
pan and Pot-79 But evidently well aware that in such an arrangement 
he would be reduced to a mere figurehead, Sihanouk also hoped to 
widen his personal base of support by forming a new organisation of 
his own, the above mentioned FUNCINPEC. Sihanouk's former 
premier, In Tam, became FUNCINPEC's chief spokesman at vari-
ous international meetings. Sihanouk also approached China and 
the United States to assist him in the further organization and supply 
77. See Henry Kamm, "Pol Pot's Grip on Cambodians Seems to Slip," The New 
York Times, Oct. 6, 1979, at A3, col. 3; Henry Kamm, "Cambodian Refugees Show No 
Desire to Return Home," The New York Times, Oct. 20, 1979, at A3, col. 2. 
78. Agence France Presse dispatch, Paris, February 13, 1980 (FBIS, February 14, 
1980). 
79. Agence France Presse dispatch, Beijing, February 10, 1981) (FBIS, February 10, 
1981). 
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of weapons for his own "independent army."80 
Early in March 1981, reportedly at Chinese urging, Sihanouk 
had what was described as a "difficult" conversation with Sampan in 
Pyongyang. Sihanouk at this time insisted on the need for a laying 
down of arms by all armed factions in Kampuchea once the 
Vietnamese agreed to withdraw. Sihanouk in this conversation with 
Sampan also declared that only an international peacekeeping force 
could assure Kampuchea's neutrality.81 It may be emphasized that 
these demands of Sihanouk's were reflected also in the ASEAN For-
eign Minister's own Kampuchean peace proposals developed during 
their June, 1981 Manila conference82 and which were rejected by 
Beijing a month later at the UN-sponsored conference on 
Kampuchea. According to Sihanouk it was Beijing which had been 
trying to get him to head an anti-Vietnamese "united front." But, 
said Sihanouk, as early as February 1981, he had made known his 
conditions to the Chinese. These conditions, to which the Chinese 
did not formally respond, included the disarming of armed factions 
in Kampuchea and entry of an international peace-keeping force. 
They included as well the demand that China provide weapons to 
Sihanoukist forces similar in amount to the assistance being received 
in Sihanoukist forces similar in amount to the assistance being re-
ceived by the Sampan-Pot regime.83 
By its stance at the New York conference, Beijing made it plain 
that its wish to see Sihanouk head a "united front" was not as strong 
as its determination to keep its own channel of influence in 
Kampuchea by means of its "Democratic Kampuchea" client. Siha-
nouk did not fail to read this Chinese signal. Though, one will re-
call, Sihanouk subsequently attended the September 1981, Singapore 
conference along with Sampan and Sann, he declared that he had 
done so only reluctantly. In Singapore, Sihanouk criticized Sann 
and Sampan as ''warmongers" who hold_ "intransigent" views, and 
added that Chinese leaders had told him that Kampuchea had to be 
prepared to wage a long war "of 10 or 20 years, against the 
Vietnamese," if necessary, until victory was achieved. But, said 
Sihanouk, he was convinced that Cambodia "could never win such a 
war", and that only "honorable compromise" could bring a way 
out.84 -
80. Agence France Presse dispatch, Singapore, Apri123, 1981 (FBIS, Apri124, 1981). 
81. Kyodo dispatch, Pyongyang, March 12, 1981 (FBIS, March 12, 1981). 
82. See note 18 supra. 
83. The Straits Times, February 9, 1981. 
84. Agence France Presse dispatch, SeptemberS, 1981 (FBIS, September 15, 1981). 
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Since the Singapore conference, and even as the "united front" 
ad hoc committee in Bangkok continued to seek a compromise, 
Sihanouk voiced disappointment and skepticism over Superpower 
policies in the Kampuchean question. But Sihanouk's own future as 
a possibly broadly acceptable "Third Alternative" figure in an "hon-
orable compromise" formula has dimmed. Beijing has shown that it 
desires him primarily to be a figurehead, with real power staying 
with the Sampan group. Hanoi's and the Heng Samrin regime's op-
position to Sihanouk remain strong. To the Phnom Penh media to-
day, Sihanouk has 4'chosen to be a lackey of the Beijing 
expansionists," and his own peace~seeking efforts are being ridiculed 
as comparable to the "loud noises" made by "a peddlar at a 
marketplace. " 85 
Lookilig at the main "alternative factions" in the Kampuchean 
question, the outstanding fact that emerges is the obvious inability of 
these factions to come together in a policy and operational frame-
work by means of which effective military and diplomatic pressure 
might be exerted on the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. On 
the contrary, the divisiveness among the major anti-Vietnamese fac-
tions solidifies the Heng Samrin regime's position, even as it encour-
ages various lesser claimants in the murky underworld of the refugee 
camps and Thai border towns. Among these, for example, is one 
Andre Oukthol, a former Kampuchean student in France, who also 
calls himself Prince Norodom Soriyavong and asserts a family rela-
tionship with Sihanouk. The latter has repudiated such ties. 
Oukthol heads a shadowy "National Movement for the Liberation of 
Kampuchea." 
The consequences of factional divisiveness and disintegration of 
control over the anti-Vietnamese resistance also are evident in the 
worsening gang warfare along the Thai-Kampuchean border. In the 
middle of October 1981, rival bands of Kampuchean guerrillas, 
firing grenade launchers and automatic rifles, killed twenty villagers 
during a battle for control of the lucrative black market at Ban Kok 
No Nong Do village in Thailand. The guerrillas, according to one 
report, belonged to a faction of Son Sann's "Khmer People's Na-
tional Liberation Front" led by Chea Chut. Chut, onetime soldier in 
the Cambodian forces of President Lon Nol, tied to the Thai border 
in 1975. According to another report, however, Chut now leads his 
own movement, the "Free Khmers." Ban Kok Ko Non do's black 
market, where at the time of Chea Chut's attack, several dozens of 
85. Radio Phnom Penh, February 16, 1981 (FBIS, February 18, 1981). 
36 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
villagers were buying gold from various anti-Vietnamese 
Kampuchean insurgents, was controlled by another former Lon Nol 
soldier, In Sak.han, whose loyalties are uncertain. Chea Chut's at-
tack derives significance from the fact that, according to border ob-
servers, about $40,000 worth of "business" daily is being transacted 
at Ban Kok Ko Non Do alone, and that "as much as half a million 
dollars changes hands daily along the border."86 
Under these conditions Kampuchean factionalism acquires an 
added dimension. Corrupt Thai officials, rival refugee gangs also 
styling themselves "liberation" fighters, Kampuchean villagers from 
all over the country in desperate need of food and consumer goods, 
various would-be or deposed Kampuchean politicians aspiring to 
power, and others now use the murky frontier world to their particu-
lar advantage. A stable and relatively efficient system of public ad-
ministration by a generally acknowledged central government 
authority· might greatly improve the misery of the refugee flotsam in 
the camps, and the plight of the great mass of Kampuchea's peas-
antry, whether in "Democratic Kampuchea" or PRK-dominated ter-
ritory. But it would not necessarily be so for those who have an 
economic interest in the political chaos of Western Cambodia and 
along the Thai frontier. One can only speculate at this point as to 
the extent to which such economic interest is a factor not only in 
impeding the formation of an effective anti-Vietnamese "united 
front," but also in preventing the Vietnamese forces and their Heng 
Samrin allies from launching an all-out offensive against "Demo-
cratic Kampuchea" and stabilizing the PRK's territorial and sover-
eign claims. 
In the meantime, the border world continues to obey its own 
political and economic imperatives. In mid-October 1981, the Thai 
military's "Supreme Command Information Office" reported that 
clashes between Thai forces and various armed Kampuhean groups 
involved in smuggling, black market and other illegal frontier trade 
had begun to increase since September - just about the time that 
the ''united front's" ad hoc committee began its Bangkok discus-
sions. The increased clashes officially were attributed, however, to 
the continuing severity of the shortage of food and commodities in-
side Kampuchea. 87 
86. See "Around the World- Rival Cambodian Rebels Kill 20 at Thai Border," 
The New York Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at A9, coL I; The Bangkok Post, October 18, 1981. 
87. "Voice of Free Asia," Bangkok, October 16, 1981 (FBIS, October 19, 1981). 
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IV. CONCLUSION: OPTIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR A 
POSSffiLE SOLUTION 
In light of the preceding what are the likely developments in the 
Kampuchean crisis and what are the policy options open to the 
United States and other powers? Four answers and possible scena-
rios suggest themselves. 
1. Continuance of the status quo. This would mean a long-term 
conflict, in which the PRK., ever more deeply dependent on 
Vietnamese and direct Soviet support, probably would find it in-
creasingly more costly to defeat completely a Beijing-supp0rted 
"Democratic Kampuchea." Such a relatively low voltage, protracted 
civil war, if.Sihanouk is to be believed88 would suit the PRC interest 
of "bleeding" the SRV and the Soviet Union ''white." But it would 
hardly benefit the mass of Kampucheans seeking an end to decades 
of violence on their soil. 
Though she is in a more precarious condition, Thailand too 
would benefit from a weak and divided Cambodia that in many 
ways would have become Vietnam's (and perhaps the Soviet 
Union's) "Vietnam." The historic roots of ethnic and dynastic con-
flict and mutual bias go deep in the Thai-Indochina area. Thailand 
would have good reason to be fearful of a strong, stable Indochina 
"federation," dominated by Vietnam. Even in the unlikely event 
that a broadly acceptable, third alternative and "neutral" regime 
were to establish itself firmly in Kampuchea, there could be 
problems for Bangkok, because of unresolved disputes over bounda-
ries and population migration. In short, just as China has histori-
cally preferred weak and compliant neighbors along her southern 
flank, so Thailand has a security interest in a feeble and riven 
Kampuchea. Moreover, the dangers posed by the Kampuchean ref-
ugee problem along her border and the possibility of its exploitation 
by Hanoi are to some extent mitigated by (I) Beijing's repeated as-
surances that China will come to Thailand's aid in the event of a 
Vietnamese attack, and (2) the previously mentioned benefits of the 
illegal trade along the frontier. 
For nearly two decades the Bangkok government has pointed to 
Laos and Vietnam as training and supply bases for the insurgents of 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).89 According to a press in-
88. See note 74 supra. 
89. Royal Thai Government, Communist Suppression Operations Command, Com-
munist insurgency in ThaUand (Bangkok, 1973), pp. 16-20. 
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terview in mid-October 1981 with a senior Thai military com-
mander, General Sak Buntharakun, documents captured from 
Laotian officers reveal that Hanoi is committed to incorporating the 
17 northeastern provinces of Thailand into Laotian territory as part 
of the Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese federation. 90 The role of 
Kampuchea as yet another source of Communist subversion in Thai-
land would depend very much on the nature of the regime in Phnom 
Penh. Beijing under present circumstances finds it easy to persuade 
Bangkok to be as intransigent in a Kampuchean settlement as the 
Chinese appear to be themselves. Only a "united front" compromise 
formula that does not jeopardize Chinese interests is likely to be ac-
ceptable to Bangkok. In the meantime, any political process, such as 
the September 1981 Singapore conference on Kampuchea, that can 
add a measure of respectability to "Democratic Kampuchea," or that 
holds out the promise of a Kampuchean solution in which the Sam-
pan-Pot regime is actively involved, is likely to find China's endorse-
ment, provided it does not threaten the de facto powers of the 
Sampan-Pot regime. However, a protracted guerrilla war of moder-
ate intensity in Kampuchea, one that keeps the Indochinese states 
weak and drains Soviet resources, is what Beijing would prefer. 
For the United States, under the Reagan administration, the 
East-West conflict and the need to contain the looming Soviet strate-
gic danger is clearly the first foreign policy priority. Washington 
today shares the perception of such a hardline ASEAN state as Sin-
gapore, which has noted with alarm the recent march of Soviet 
power in Asia "From Phnom Penh to Kabul."91 Supporting China's 
status quo policy in the Kampuchean question and thus weakening 
both Vietnam and her patron, the Soviet Union fits the United 
States' containment policy quite well. Soviet naval vessels riding at 
anchor at Kampuchea's Kompong Som or Vietnam's Cam Ranh 
Bay harbors; Soviet technicians installing sophisticated electronic 
surveillance facilities in Laos, and increasingly participating in the 
rehabilitation of Heng Samrin's PRK; Moscow, at a rate of $3 mil-
lion a day, pouring economic and military assistance into Vietnam 
- all those are but elements of a global Soviet strategic thrust that 
reaches from South Asia to the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and into 
Central America. 
Confident that the ASEAN states, including Malaysia and Indo-
90. The Bangkok Post, October 11, 1981. 
91. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, From Phnom Penh to Kabul (Singapore, 
September, 1980). 
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nesia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, can be counted on in this new East-West confrontation, the 
United States at the moment sees no good reason to strain relations 
with China by taking new initiatives to break the Kampuchean 
deadlock. On the contrary, since a number of issues, such as the 
status of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and its relationship to 
Washington, are a source of friction between China and the United 
States, the Kampuchea issue affords the Reagan administration an 
especially valuable opportunity to underscore its sincerity in 
strengthening relations with Beijing. For the moment, the disquiet 
such a US policy posture creates in prominent ASEAN circles, in 
Japan, and in some Commonwealth countries, to say nothing of the 
havoc which the status quo and protracted fighting has on the 
Kampuchean people, are not sufficient to bring a change. 
2. Intens!fied Sino-Soviet cm!flict through Indochinese proxies. 
Kampuchea today seems like Spain in the nineteen thirties, a testing 
ground of conflict between certain major powers. Since 1975 and the 
Communist capture of Saigon, the struggle between People's China 
and the Soviet Union for control of Indochina has been particularly 
evident, each of the major Communist powers has sought to capital-
ize on centuries-old ethinic antagonisms and border disputes in the 
region. The Communist Party of Kampuchea long had to live in the 
shadow of Hanoi's dominance. Cambodian Communists, in the 
course of 1975, were determined to assert their independent leader-
ship. In this they enjoyed backing from the start from a China ever 
concerned with following a divide and rule policy among weak and 
preferably compliant neighbors. The Vietnamese Communists' in-
tent, manifested in the course of 1975 and subsequent years, to tum 
their victory in South Vietnam into a Hanoi-dominated Indochinese 
alliance as well, did not at all suit Beijing.92 In June and July 1975, 
it came to fierce fighting between Cambodian and Vietnamese Com-
munist forces over control of the island of Poulo Wai and adjacent 
islands in the Gulf of Siam, as well as over border territories such as 
the "Parrot's Beak" in Cambodia's Stay Rieng province which juts 
into Vietnam. 93 
Sino-Soviet rivalry intruded in the midst of and indeed fanned 
92. On this Indochinese alliance, see Justus M. van der K.roef, "New Patterns of 
Strategic Confiict in Southeast Asia," Parameters, The Journal of the U.S. Army War 
College, June, 1989, pp. 60-68. 
93. See ''Vietnamese Said to Capture an Island Off Cambodia," New York Times, 
June 14, 1975, at AI, col. 4; Henry Kamm, "A Laos Army Met Defeat Before Battle," 
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this developing Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict. In August.l975, 
the People's Republic of China and the new state of "Democratic 
Kampuchea," led by premier Pol Pot, signed a "Friendship and Co-
operation Treaty," which provided the Kampucheans with $1 billion 
in economic and military assistance. By May 1976, Thai sources 
were reporting that there were some 1,000 Chinese advisers in 
Phnom Penh, and Chinese vessels were busily and continuously un-
loading cargoes of ammunition, ·rice, and other commodities at 
Ko~pong Som harbor. Already in October 1975, however, 
Vietnamese party Secretary Le Duan had visited Moscow and the 
Russians agreed to a new Soviet assistance program for the SRV. 
This included industrial development projects valued at $500 million 
at least. A Soviet-Vietnamese declaration at the time of the Le Duan 
visit said that the two nations shared a "full identity of views," and 
Le Duan praised the Soviet Union for having been "the first to have 
opened the road to Socialism" for mankind.94 
In subsequent months and years relations between the SRV and 
"Democratic Kampuchea" steadily worsened. For example, in April 
1978, a Japanese correspondent who visited the Cambodian-
Vietnamese frontier reported that "incessant clashes take place prac-
tically across the entire length of the 1100 kilometres border" of the 
Vietnamese provinces which he had visited. 95 Both Beijing and 
Moscow meanwhile continued to back their respective Indochinese 
proxies. In mid-January 1978, at a time when Pol Pot's forces had 
been repeatedly and deeply penetrating Vietnam's Tai Ninh prov-
ince, China's "People's Daily" (Jen-min jih-pao) praised Pol Pot's 
army for "defending and helping to build the Motherland," also 
quoting a Cambodian national hymn of praise for the Army. Mos-
cow, at the same time, charged the Chinese with having provoked 
the continuing border fighting. 96 
As early as the close of 1977, the Vietnamese, wearying of 
Cambodian raids, had launched a major counter-offensive, penetrat-
ing up to 20 miles into "Democratic Kampuchean" territory with 
some 58,000 troops. On November 3, 1978, just before they moved 
New York Times, June 22, 1975, at A4, col. 4; Henry K.amm, "Pathet Lao Theme is Self-
Reliance," New York Times, June 25, 1975, at AS, col. 1. 
94. See, e.g, Carlyle A. Thayer, "Australia and Vietnam," Dyason House Papers 
(Melbourne), March, 1980, p. 8; The Bangkok Post, May 5, 1976; "Official Friendly Visit 
of a Party and Government Delegation of the DRY to the Soviet Union," Information 
Bulletin (Prague), vol. 13, 1975, no. 20-21 p.38. 
95 . .Katsuhiko Suzuki inAkahata (Tokyo), Aprilll, 1978) (FBIS, Aprill7, 1978). 
96. The Straits Times, January 14, 1978. 
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into Kampuchea in force, with the clear intent of driving out the Pol 
Pot regime altogether, Hanoi and Moscow signed a twenty-five year 
treaty of "friendship and cooperation." Article 6 of this treaty pro-
vides that an attack on either of the two signatories will prompt mu-
tual consultation and the taking of "appropriate measures" to insure 
mutual security. Mter January 7, 1979, when Hanoi radio an-
nounced that Phnom Penh had fallen and was now in the hands of 
Heng Samrin's KNUFNS, Soviet aid to the Vietnamese greatly ac-
celerated. In 1977, such aid had amounted to $500 million. Bu after 
February 1979, and the brief Chinese "punitive" incursion into Viet-
nam, Soviet assistance leaped to about $1.5 billion. Some 30 percent 
of the SRV's rice imports now depend on the USSR and about 60 
percent of Vietnam's Five Year Plan of 1976-1980 ($3.2 billion) was 
funded by Moscow.97 Already on June 29, 1978, the SRV entered 
Comecon (the Moscow-dominated Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance in Eastern Europe), and the process of incorporating 
Heng Samrin's PRK into Comecon is virtually complete. 
Meanwhile Sino-Vietnamese antagonisms deepened still fur-
ther, particularly after the fall of Phnom Penh, when the Vietnamese 
extended their purge campaign against ethnic Chinese to 
Kampuchea. The harrowing tales of Chinese refugees from Vietnam 
and Kampuchea, arriving in the PRC recounting how they had been 
forced out of their shops, herded into agricultural cooperatives and 
deprived of food during enforced long journeys, doubtlessly played a 
part in the development of Beijing's uncompromising stance in the 
Kampuchean problem today. SRV-Chinese discussions to settle mu-
tual differences, which began after the Chinese "lesson," soon broke 
down. As early as December 1979, the RV wired UN Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim that a new Chinese ''war of aggression" 
could erupt at any moment. From the Vietnamese perspective, 
China's own alleged plans to establish its hegemony over a 
"'balkanised' superpower free Southeast Asia" as part of its own 
southern security have been thwarted.98 
Considering the political and economic investment which the 
Soviet Union and the PRC respectively have made by now in the 
warring Kampuchean camps either a defeat or a disengagement 
from the conflict may well seem unthinkable for either Moscow or 
Beijing. To be sure, if one disregards their Ussuri River border 
97. Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp," Asian Survey, De-
cember, 1979, pp. ll64-ll66. 
98. The Straits Times, June ll, 1980. 
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clashes, nowhere in the world, and at no time since their spectacular 
rupture more than two decades ago, have the PRC and the Soviet 
Union militarily confronted each other. But Kampuchea surely is 
among the instances closest to it, even if the confrontation is prima-
rily by proxies (according to the Soviets themselves, however, Rus-
sian military advisers were killed during the Vietnamese drive on 
Phnom Penh).99 Though in many respects their brief invasion of Vi-
etnam in February 1979, was hardly a significantly military success 
for the Chinese, Beijing did prove with this strike that it was pre-
pared actually to back up its anger at Hanoi with force. Moscow's 
reaction to the Chinese strike was confined to verbal denunciations. 
A second Chinese intervention likely would bring a more forceful 
Soviet response. China's commitment to a strategy of protracted, 
guerrilla-style war in Kampuchea, and of "bleeding" Vietnam and 
its Soviet sponsor ''white," may for a while keep the level of violence 
down. But precisely because of this Chinese strategy, and the high 
stakes for the Soviet Union in maintaining its influence in Indo-
china, the temptation for both the Vietnamese and the Soviets to 
launch an all-out campaign and attempt to demolish the Sampan-
Pot regime once and for all may become irresistible. A commensu-
rate Chinese response, including a new strike against the SR V, 
would bring dangerous new dimensions to what S. Rajaratnam, Sin-
gapore's deputy premier for foreign affairs already has called "the 
age of Communist wars in Asia." 
Such a development would be particularly unwelcome to the 
United States. Since the Vietnam war, American security interests 
have focused on what has been called "tacit regional security coali-
tions.'1100 These are not necessarily formal treaty-specific alliances. 
Rather, they are varying forms of partnership, involving close eco-
nomic links and technological transfers, implementation of common 
diplomatic objectives and tactics at the United Nations and other 
international gatherings, and flexible, non-binding forms of military 
assistance, consultation and cooperation. Asia has been a major fo-
cus of thi US strategy, and two "tacit regional security coalitions" 
are said to be evident in the region, ASEAN and a "China-Japan-US 
triangle." 101 Though with some elements of these coalitions, e.g. the 
Philippines and Japan, the United States has formal treaty commit-
99. USSR Source Confirms Advisers Killed in Phnom Penh," FBIS, August 14, 
1979. 
100. Kim Woodard, "The Second Transition: America in Asia Under Carter," SAIS 
Review, Winter, 1981, p. 131. 
101. Ibid 
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ments, the alliance systems are generally as yet fragile, and in opera-
tional specifics, still often very much ''tacit" (e.g. the US-ASEAN 
relationship). Thus far the Kampuchean crisis, at its present level of 
intensity, has tended to encourage the further growth of this carefully 
understated Asian regional security system, although, as we have 
seen, in ASEAN circles like Indonesia and Malaysia, there is already 
serious disquiet over China's policy and the evident close US sup-
port for it. But a vaulting escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict 
through its Indochinese proxies would place the still evolving coali-
tion system under a severe strain, compel "either/or" commitments 
that are not ready to be made, and undo the quiet building of US 
security structures developed since the end of the Vietnam war. 
3. A "Third Alternative,.for Kampuchea. When the ''Third Al-
ternative" concept first surfaced in the course of 1979 it tended to 
revolve around some single Cambodian figure (Sihanouk's name 
was often heard), who might be found acceptable by the two princi-
pal Kampuchean antagonists, the Sampan-Pot and Heng Samrin re-
gimes and their Chinese and Soviet-Vietnamese backers 
respectively. 102 In the convoluted world of Cambodian exile politics 
and refugee camp power struggles other competing "Third Alterna-
tive" claimants soon arose. As has been noted, those with an interest 
either in developing their own "Third Alternative" claimant, or in 
preventing a viable ''Third Alternative" from developing because 
they prefer a weak, near chaotic or compliant Cambodia, were quick 
to lend a measure of support. . 
The result was that by 1980, the "Third Alternative" notion 
moved in a new direction, i.e. an anti-Vietnamese ''united front" ar-
rangement that included rather than was an alternative to the Sam-
pan-Pot regime. As a consequence, whatever chance the ''Third 
Alternative" might have had in Hanoi and Moscow quickly evapo-
rated. Moreover, the mutual hostility between the three major 
"united front" participants and the near debacle of their September 
1981 conference in Singapore103 could only encourage the Soviets 
and Vietnamese. It may well have prompted the latter to suggest an 
important ''Third Alternative" gambit of their own, i.e. a changed 
and broadened Heng Samrin government so that ASEAN would 
have "a new group" in Phnom Penh "to talk to." 104 ''Third Alterna-
102. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia: A 'Third Alternative,' "Asian Affairs, No-
vember-December, 1979, pp. 105-116. 
103. See notes 26 and 27 supra. 
104. See note 15 supra. 
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tive" thinking thus has become polarized today in terms of the inter-
ests of the two chief antagonists and their superpower patrons, rather 
than in terms of a possible, commonly accepted middle ground re-
gime. Like the wrangling in Bangkok among the delegates of the 
united front's" ad hoc committee, this polarization renders prospects 
for a "Third Alternative" even bleaker. 
It might be noted that the majority of the UN's members appear 
to have agreed on their particular modality of a ''Third Alternative" 
as the solution to the Kampuchean problem. Under the terms of the 
final, French-conceived compromise resolution on Kampuchea's fu-
ture government, adopted by the July, 1981 UN-sponsored confer-
ence in New York, "free elections" in conditions of "law and order" 
are to be held in Kampuchea after foreign troops there have been 
withdrawn. Implicit is the idea that after such Kampuchean elec-
tions another, presumably "neutral" government will emerge, and 
that neither Pol Pot nor Heng Samrin is likely to lead it. Both Ha-
noi's and Moscow's sharply negative reaction to the New York con-
ference resolution, and the obvious absence of any machinery of 
enforcing the implementation of the resolution itself, make it un-
likely that a "Third Alternative" regime will come to Kampuchea in 
this way. There may well be value in the New York resolution as an 
expression of moral purpose on the part of the United States and the 
rest of the world community in the Kampuchean problem. But the 
practical effect of the New York conference, including its implied 
"Third Alternative" proposal, was to endorse the status quo, i.e. 
China's policy of protracted conflict in Kampuchea with all the dan-
gers of deepening political polarization in the area and havoc in 
Kampuchea itself. 
4. A new initiative toward Vietnam. An appreciation of this 
policy option requi!es a brief glance at recent US diplomatic history 
in Asia. 
In November 1978, shortly before Vietnamese forces stormed 
into Phnom Penh and drove out the Pol Pot regime, a Canadian 
journalist, after an extended journey through the SRV, reported that 
"I ran into Russians everywhere I went," and that there appeared to 
be a lively Vietnamese awareness of Russian maneuvering to en-
hance Moscow's position in Vietnam. The reporter also was in-
formed "several times" by Vietnamese officials that "if the United 
States were genuinely concerned about this problem it was more 
than welcome to help to provide some balance and alternatives -
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fast." 105 By the time this report appeared, however, the Carter ad-
ministration had already decided to strengthen further American ties 
with the PRC instead, thus foreclosing for the time being a policy of 
reapprochement toward Hanoi that had begun nearly two years 
earlier. 
In the 1977-78 period, as Phnom Penh-Hanoi relations were be-
ginning to strain but had not yet reached the breaking point, it was 
evident that the Vietnamese, though feeling compelled to forge close 
links with Moscow, still were anxious to avoid a one-sided foreign 
policy, the risk of growing isolation, and widening hostility in their 
region. Hanoi, at the time, was not only urging a new form of "re-
gional cooperation" on, and better relations with, ASEAN 106 but, 
more importantly, also was making overtures toward the United 
States as well. For example, during his July 1978 visit to Australia, 
SRV deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, evidently in the context of 
an overall policy statement to widen Vietnam's international accept-
ance and "in a message clearly intended for Washington", informed 
Australian cabinet officials that the SRV no longer considered pay-
ment of US war damages as a prerequisite for normalizing relations 
with Washington. 107 Phan Hien also emphasized his government's 
more positive attitude toward the ASEAN organisation. These 
Vietnamese initiatives were prompted no doubt by the realization 
that Vietnam's stagnant, wartorn national economy and rehabilita-
tion needs urgently demanded greater access to the financial and 
commercial resources of the Western world, lest the SR V become 
wholly dependent on the Eastern bloc. 
By the middle of 1978, as one US commentator later was to put 
it, the SRV and the United States ''were near a historic friendship": 
Hanoi's emissaries were in Honolulu aiding US military personnel in 
identifying US military still listed as missing in action from the Viet-
nam war; Hanoi had dropped her demand for "reparations" which 
SRV spokesmen long claimed President Richard Nixon had prom-
ised, and a number of US Congressmen, after visiting Hanoi, began 
urging full US-Vietnamese diplomatic relations. 108 Talk of estab-
lishing such relations was still heard in September 1978, when US 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, and SR V deputy 
105. John Fraser, "A Communist Peace: Its Meaning for Vietnam," The Straits 
Times, December 6, 1978. 
106. See note 5 supra. 
107. Carlyle A. Thayer, "Australia and Vietnam," note 94 supra, p. 8. 
108. Peter Kovler, "More Tunnel, Less Light," The New York Times, January 9, 1979, 
at Al9, col. I. 
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Foreign Minister Nguyen Co That were in New York reportedly dis-
cussing "such practical problems as where to put the United States 
Embassy in Hanoi." 109 
Within weeks this atmosphere was to change, however, even 
though all the while relations between Phnom Penh and Hanoi were 
worsening and crying out for a mitigating influence. As the Carter 
administration played its "China card," and decided to firm up as 
soon as possible its relations with Beijing, the opportunity fo!' the 
United States to exercise such a moderating influence in the 
Vietnamese-Cambodian crisis, let alone proceed with diplomatic 
recognition of the SRV, disappeared. By mid-December 1978, as the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea accelerated, the SRV's Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh was to charge that while Hanoi had 
wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Washington, it was the 
United States which had been "stalling." According to Trinh, the 
Carter administration was "using the refugee situation and our bor-
der problem with Cambodia as excuses" to forestall formal diplo-
matic exchange. 110 Carter Administration officials reportedly were 
admitting as much themselves. US officials, citing the priority needs 
of the Washington-Beijing-Moscow balance of power (and, presum-
ably, its necessary prerequisite, i.e. formal US recognition of Peo-
ple's China) in mid-December were quoted as saying that Vietnam 
had been put on the diplomatic "backbumer." The reason given was 
that a sudden reapprochement with Hanoi, in view of its present re-
lation with Beijing, would have seemed inappropriate. 111 By this 
time, Hanoi already had begun to tum to the USSR, signing on No-
vember 3, 1978 the previously mentioned friendship treaty. What 
was to become the Kampuchean deadlock was rapidly being set in 
place. 
Need events have taken this tum? It can probably never be es-
tablished one way or the other whether an American-Vietnamese 
diplomatic reapprochement, even as late as early October 1978, 
would have provided Washington with some leverage with which to 
mitigate the deepening Cambodian crisis. Meanwhile, it might be 
asked, has the United States gained all that much from the Carter 
Administration's playing of the "China card" and the formal diplo-
109. Ibid 
110. "World News Briefs" - "Vietnamese Accuses U.S. of Delaying Diplomatic 
Ties," New York Times, Dec. 20, 1978, at A15, col. 1. Hanoi's main daily, Nltan Dan, on 
February 9, 1979 editorially charged the United States again with delaying diplomatic 
normalization because of the Cambodian fighting. 
111. "Was Vietnam Pushed?," Asiaweek (Hong Kong), December 22, 1978, p. 8. 
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matic recognition of Beijing? Whatever the answer, there is little 
doubt that Hanoi has been driven deeper into the arms of Moscow, 
and probably with steadily diminishing enthusiasm for the embrace. 
With the Vietnamese dependence on Moscow, the Kampuchean 
problem has become more intractable. 
There has never been any doubt of the high nationalistic con-
tent in the SRV's Communist ideology, before or since the fall of 
Saigon. The longer and heavier Vietnam's economic and strategic 
dependence on Moscow becomes, the deeper the Vietnamese resent-
ment of the "Americans without dollars," as the burgeoning number 
of Russians in the SRV derivsively are being called is likely to be-
come. The editor of Asia's leading current events weekly, Derek Da-
vies, recently asserted that it is "Time to encourage the Vietnamese 
Titoists," adding that the "present concerted hostility" led by the 
United States and the PRC toward Hanoi is unlikely to cause the 
latter to change its policy in Kampuchea. On the contrary, the net 
effect of the Sino-US policy in the Kampuchean question is that 
"ASEAN's most precious commodity- its hard won political unity 
will be dissipated. Is this a foreign policy goal of Washington? Or of 
Peking?" 112 
Davies' observation that ASEAN unity may be fractured refers 
to the repeatedly noted perception of leading ASEAN circles, nota-
bly in Indonesia and Malaysia, that China, not Vietnam constitutes 
the greater danger to the Southeast Asian region. 113 Indeed, from 
this perspective, a unified, stable Vietnam an Indochina are seen to 
serve as a useful buffer between ASEAN and a resurgent, modern-
ized China. In early October 1981, at the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in Melbourne, Australia, both Singapore and 
Malaysia once again stressed their fear of China. Singapore's Lee 
Kuan Yew said that in his region, and because of Beijing's refusal to 
cut its links with Southeast Asian Communist movements, "There 
are apprehensions at the long term implications of a strong, 
modernised China .... For a country that cannot afford economic 
or military aid in order to influence the policies of the smaller coun-
tries of Asia, harassment throuff guerrilla insurgencies in a second 
best instrument of infiuence."1 4 Malaysia's Foreign Minister Tan 
Sri Ghazali Shafie expressed similar concerns by referring to the im-
112. Derek Davies, ''Time to Encourage the Vietnamese Titoists," Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, July 17, 1981, pp. 30-31. 
113. See note 45 supra. 
114. Anne Summers, "Indira blackballs Zia," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 114, 
no. 42 (Oct. 9, 1981), p. 8. 
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plications of the recent US decision to co~sider supplying arms to 
China. As Ghazali put it, "If the Americans do not take into account 
China's policies in Asia . . . then the assistance the US gives might 
be negative for us." Ghazali added that it was one thing for the 
United States "to support China in its global strategy," but quite an-
other if that United States support strenfthened Chinese-assisted 
"subversion against us by the guerillas." 11 
Even in Thailand there appear to be second thoughts about the 
wisdom of following a hardline anti-Vietnamese policy in the 
Kampuchean question. Former Thai Foreign Minister Phichai Rat-
takakun declared in September 1981 that Thai policy vacillations to-
ward the Pol Pot government and the SRV in the past had failed to 
win for Bangkok stable relations with either, and hence that it was 
now time to improve Thailand's posture toward Hanoi rather than 
continue to back the· ousted Sampan-Pot regime. Rattanakun said 
he saw advantages for Thailand in Hanoi's current effort to rebuild 
Kampuchea, as this would open new markets in all of Indochina for 
Thailand and also offer opportunities to build peace. 116 Meanwhile, 
in Indonesia in particular, there is appreciation for Vietnam'~r 
for that matter Kampuchea's-nationalism as a constant in the polit-
ical equations of Indochina and in the search for political balance in 
foreign relations. Indonesia's Vice President Adam Malik, long his 
country's Foreign Minister, and one of ASEAN's veteran diplomats, 
observed at the close of 1978, as the struggle between Pol Pot's 
"Democratic Kampuchea" and the invading Vietnamese was reach-
ing a climax, that he did not believe in a "permanent friendship," 
either between Pol's regime and China, or for that matter between 
the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union. Hanoi, with its long history 
of independence struggle against the French and the United States, 
was hardly likely now to become a "pawn" or an "ally" of the Soviet 
Union, according to Malik. Hanoi needed Moscow, at the moment, 
Malik added, because of Vietnamese economic requirements, just at 
the Pol Pot regime had sought assistance from Beijing. 117 But one-
sided dependencies, Malik implied, hardly suited either the national-
ist temper of the Vietnamese or of the Kampucheans or their foreign 
policy aspirations. 
To the United States the ASEAN views appear to be of lesser 
significance than the need to maintain improved and improving rela-
115. Ibid. 
116. The Asia Record, October, 1981, pp. 8, 28. 
117. Malik interview in the Frankforther Allgemeine, December 19, 1978 (FBIS, De-
cember 21, 1978). 
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tions with Beijing. Moreover, and evidently putting confidence in 
the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean resistance, adherents of the pres-
ent US policy might well ask why the Kampuchean nationalism to 
which Malik and others have alluded, could not be mobilized to 
drive the Vietnamese out? The answer, as has been indicated above, 
is that the factional disputes among the "united front" participants, 
however zealous such individually may be in his nationalist commit-
ment, are so severe as to preclude the forging of an effective common 
strategy. More important, even if an effective but anti-Vietnamese 
"united front" were to come into existence involving the present par-
ticipants, its campaign would doubtlessly stiffen Hanoi's and Mos-
cow's resistance, plunge Kampuchea into renewed havoc, and 
quickly place the United States before the problem of having to 
commit itself, if only through economic or military support, to an-
other Southeast Asian land war. 
The United States remains convinced that the various "diplo-
matic, economic and military pressures" being exerted on Vietnam 
today will, in the words of Assistance Secretary John Holdridge 
"achieve the objectives of ASEAN and of ASEAN's s.upporters."118 
After three years of such "pressures," however, there is no indication 
whatsoever that these objectives are any nearer. On the contrary, 
doubt within ASEAN itself about the present policy of "pressures" is 
growing. One may suggest, therefore, that another option which the 
United States still has, is to seek a new accommodation with the 
SRV. The purpose would be (1) to attempt to diminish and eventu-
ally withdraw together (Vietnamese military forces from 
Kampuchea, (2) bring about an "alternative" Kampuchean govern-
ment that is sensitive to Hanoi's security interests but also reflective 
of Kampuchean national wishes, and (3) lessen Vietnamese eco-
nomic and strategic dependence on the Soviet Union. Such an ac-
commodation could proceed from the earlier discussed "Kuantan 
principle" 119 and instead of basing itself on the present "united 
front" concept, might instead proceed from an "altered" Heng 
Samrin regime referred to above. 120 It also would have to overcome 
admittedly formidable protests from the PRC which appears 
118. "Recent Developments in Indochina," statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State John H. Holdridge before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on 
East Asia and Pacific Affairs, October 22, 1981, Cu"ent Policy (U.S. Department of 
State, no. 344), October 22, 1981, p. 2. 
119. See note 7 supra. 
120. See note 15 supra. 
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strongly committed to its "bleed Vietnam white" policy in 
Kampuchea. 
Finding the proper leverage in Beijing might well prove to be 
more difficult for the United States than persuading Hanoi that there 
may be advantages in a trade-off between a Kampuchean with-
drawal and an end to isolation. Yet, amidst all its hardline rhetoric, 
China's development needs remain as real as Hanoi's, and no one 
knows this better than the new, pragmatic, Deng Xiaoping leader-
ship in Beijing. "The only reason why we're supporting Democratic 
Kampuchea's credentials," one US Congressional source reported at 
the time of the July 1981 New York conference, "is that the Chinese 
want us to." 121 It is not readily apparent what the United States has 
gained thus far from such unenthusiastic support for China. 
No sudden dramatic moves need figure in the search for such a 
new US rapprochement toward Hanoi - small steps could be taken 
first such as a renewed effort to clear up the problem of remaining 
US missing in action, the gradual lifting of the US embargo on trade 
with the SRV, or a signal that Hanoi need no longer disregard the 
United States and its major industrial allies (e.g. Japan, as sources of 
development and venture capital). Eventually, and under an ap-
propriate quid pro quo in Kampuchea, diplomatic normalization 
might be considered. 
Such an approach would bring the United States back to the 
possibility of developing a more balanced diplomatic relationship in 
Asia that existed in Asia before, in the closing months of 1978, 
Washington began to commit itself more and more completely to a 
strengthened rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. 
Opening a window to Hanoi would return the United States to the 
role of "balancer'' among the Communist super- and smaller pow-
ers, as this was perceived in the Kissinger years. Abandonment of 
that policy must be guaged by its consequences, not least in 
Kampuchea. So serious and deep has the Kampuchean deadlock 
become, and so rigidified the postures of the main antagonists, that a 
new, Hanoi-oriented, "carrot and stick" initiative by the United 
States might well be the only way to get the problem off dead center. 
The alternatives - among them continued fighting and deepening 
human misery in Kampuchea, the ever present dangers of more di-
rect and sharpened Chinese and Soviet conflict, and the policy un-
certainties, if not ruptured, within ASEAN - do not seem worth the 
risk to the United States. They are also not worthy of the post-Viet-
121. Edgar Koh in The Straits Times, July 27, 1981. 
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nam war recovery of American diplomatic leadership in Southeast 
Asia. 
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